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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645224

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Effects of Capital on Bank Risk-Taking: New Evidence for the European Banking System

  AUTHORS: Josanco Floreani, Giulio Velliscig, Piserà Stefano, Maurizio Polato

  KEYWORDS: Bank Capital, Leverage, Loan Coverage, Bank Regulation, Bank Risk, Bank Size

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.13 No.3, June 30, 2023

  ABSTRACT: After the eruption of the global financial crisis, the banking sector has gone through profound regulatory reforms aimed at strengthening the stability of the entire financial system. Based on a sample of 62 listed banks in the European Economic Area Region, during the period 2005q1-2018q4, this paper investigates the impact of capital policies on bank risk-taking. Results show how the Tier 1 capital ratio and the Tier 1 leverage ratio represent a crucial factor in explaining bank risk, especially for small banks and during financial turmoil periods. Additionally, we find that the introduction of mandatory disclosure of the Tier 1 leverage ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio reduced the bank risk-taking of higher leveraged and capitalized banks. Our findings have significant implications for both the banking industry and policymakers alike.