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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Efficient DPA Attacks on AES Hardware Implementations

  AUTHORS: Yu HAN, Xuecheng ZOU, Zhenglin LIU, Yicheng CHEN

  KEYWORDS: Security, AES, Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Power Model, Correlation Factor

  JOURNAL NAME: International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences, Vol.1 No.1, June 6, 2008

  ABSTRACT: This paper presents an effective way to enhance power analysis attacks on AES hardware implementations. The proposed attack adopts hamming difference of intermediate results as power mode. It arranges plaintext inputs to differentiate power traces to the maximal probability. A simulation-based AES ASIC implementation and experimental platform are built. Various power attacks are conducted on our AES hardware implementation. Unlike on software implementations, conventional power attacks on hardware implementations may not succeed or require more computations. However, the method we proposed effectively improves the success rate using acceptable number of power traces and fewer computations. Furthermore from experimental data, the correlation factor between the hamming distance of key guesses and the difference of DPA traces has the value 0.9233 to validate power model and attack results.