On the Coalitional Rationality of the Banzhaf Value and Other Non-Efficient Semivalues

Irinel Dragan

University of Texas, Arlington, USA.

DOI: 10.4236/am.2015.612182                

Abstract

In the Inverse Set relative to a Semivalue, we are looking for a new game for which the Semivalue of the original game is coalitional rational. The problem is solved by means of the Power Game of the given game. The procedures of building the new game, as well as the case of the Banzhaf Value are illustrated by means of some examples.

Keywords

Semivalues, Power Game, Power Core, Coalitional Rationality

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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