Game Analysis of Reputation Model on  Cooperation of Employees in Probation  Period and Formal Work Stage

Jinyi Li; Jing Li

doi:10.4236/jss.2015.310011

Home > Journals > Business & Economics | Social Sciences & Humanities > JSS

JSS> Vol.3 No.10, October 2015

Share This Article:

Open Access

Game Analysis of Reputation Model on Cooperation of Employees in Probation Period and Formal Work Stage

Abstract Full-Text HTML XML

Download as PDF (Size:251KB) PP. 74-79

DOI: 10.4236/jss.2015.310011 5,563 Downloads 5,877 Views

Author(s) Leave a comment

Jinyi Li^*, Jing Li

Affiliation(s)

School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.

ABSTRACT

A dynamic game model of reputation with incomplete information on cooperation between employees and companies in probation period and formal work stage is established. By using reputation theory of Kreps and Willson, Milgrom and Roberts, the decision-making process of employees in probation period and formal work stage and the reputation incentive effect to employees’ cooperation with companies are also analyzed. At last, two suggestions are given from this study: Firstly, companies should strengthen the probation period management; Secondly, companies should use reputation effect to motivate their employees to cooperate with them in their formal work stage.

KEYWORDS

Probation Period, Formal Work Stage, Reputation Model, Cooperation between Employees and Companies

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Li, J. and Li, J. (2015) Game Analysis of Reputation Model on Cooperation of Employees in Probation Period and Formal Work Stage. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 3, 74-79. doi: 10.4236/jss.2015.310011.

References

[1]	Lu, F.W. (2005) Game Analysis on the Cooperation of the Employee in Probation Period. East China Economic Management, 8, 120-122.

[2]	Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982) Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053182900308

[3]	Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R. (1982) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245-252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053182900291

[4]	Zhang, W.Y. (1996) Game Theory and Information Economics. Shanghai Sanlian People Press, Shanghai.

[5]	Liu, K. (2012) Discussion on the New Employee’s Management in Probation Period in Scientific Research Institutes. Human Resource Management, 6, 52.

[6]	Qiao, Y.L. (2013) Three Main Lines in Probation Period Management. Enterprise Management, 12, 76-79.

[7]	Huang, H.Y. (2015) Discussion on the Employee’s Management in Probation Period. China Nonferrous Metal, 12, 70- 71.