Research on the Influence of the Characteristics of Independent Director to the Quality of Internal Control Self-Assessment Report

Weiwei Huang

Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2015.66064                

Abstract

This article selects the empirical data from Shanghai A share, using multiple linear regression model to discuss the impact to the quality of the internal control self-assessment report from four aspects of the characteristic of the independent directors. The conclusions are that the number of independent directors, the independent directors’ proportion and the auditing professional background of independent directors are positively correlated with the quality of internal control self-assessment report, and the age of the independent directors, the independent directors’ reward and the location consistency of the independent directors and the company are negatively correlated with the quality of internal control self-assessment report. Finally, this paper gives four suggestions.

Keywords

Characteristic of Independent Director, The Quality of Internal Control Self-Assessment Report

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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