Author(s)

Xiaoying Xu¹, Maoran Ye²

¹School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.
²School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, China.

Based on repeated game and unilateral moral hazard framework, this thesis studies the formation and evolution of reputation in C2C E-Market and the restriction effect of reputation to the sellers’ moral hazard behavior. The research on reputation model shows that the formation of reputation is a dynamic process, which is regulated by sellers in C2C E-Market. In the market introducing the reputation mechanism, the most effective way to restrict moral hazard behavior is to leverage the sellers’ long-term benefits, stabilize the market, and reduce transaction cost.

Moral Hazard, Reputation Model, C2C E-Commerce

Xu, X. and Ye, M. (2017) A Study of Reputation Effect Restricting the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Commerce. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 260-268. doi: 10.4236/jss.2017.53024.