Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.3 No.4(2013), Paper ID 34728, 5 pages

DOI:10.4236/tel.2013.34033

 

Minimizing Shirking in Auctions and Tournaments

 

Chen Cohen, Moshe Schwartz

 

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ashkelon Academic College, Ashkelon, Israel

 

Copyright © 2013 Chen Cohen, Moshe Schwartz et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

How to Cite this Article

Cohen, C. and Schwartz, M. (2013) Minimizing Shirking in Auctions and Tournaments. Theoretical Economics Letters, 3, 197-201. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.34033.
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