TITLE:
Charles Taylor and Moral Realism: A Falsifiable Realism
AUTHORS:
Xuemei Wang
KEYWORDS:
Charles Taylor, Moral Realism, Goods, Moral Philosophy, Moral Projectivism
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Social Sciences,
Vol.9 No.8,
August
27,
2021
ABSTRACT: This paper aims to come to grips with the moral realism of Charles Taylor
by focusing on the debate between realists and nonrealists. I believe that a
close examination of Taylor’s moral realism can express Taylor’s critical attitude
to contemporary moral philosophy, it also brings out a new way which can face
to the challenges of nonrealism. Ruth Abby argues that Taylor’s moral realism is
different from two current popular realisms: strong
and weak moral realism and she takes Taylor’s moral realism as a falsifiable realism.
But some of Taylor’s commentators contend that
his moral realism belongs to the strong side. However, there are also
some claims that his realism is weak. I attempt to argue against those commentators
and defend his moral realism as a falsifiable realism. As a result, the contribution
of this paper is twofold. First, it reveals the
defects of both strong moral realism and weak moral realism. Second, as a
consequence, this analysis not only make us believe that Taylor’s moral realism
does not belong to strong or weak side, but also his attention to individual’s moral
life and experience has its own unique characteristic and superiority, It also illustrates the importance
of good and why his realism is called a falsifiable realism.