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https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.6

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Can Formal Institutions Lead to the Spillover Effect of Cooperation?

  AUTHORS: Rati Mekvabishvili

  KEYWORDS: Centralized Punishment, Spillover, Public Goods, Cooperation

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.11 No.2, March 31, 2021

  ABSTRACT: Can formal institutions shape prosocial behavior and lead to the spillover effect of cooperation? To explore this question, we experimentally test the spillover-based theory in a novel context. We measured the spillover effect on cooperation in the same domain measured by the repeated anonymous public goods game. We found strong evidence of altruism. Our results are inconsistent with prediction of the spillover-based theory. Our finding suggests that exposure to strong formal institutions that provide top-down motivation for cooperation substantially improves cooperation in their presence, but do not seem to lead to more prosociality after their absence.