TITLE:
The Conflict between the Pursuit of Integrity and Performance in Public Procurement
AUTHORS:
Bagassé Hervé Kafimbou
KEYWORDS:
Public Procurement, Corruption, Discretion, Model of Agency
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.9 No.5,
May
27,
2019
ABSTRACT: Does a reduction in the discretion of the public
buyer through strict regulatory and procedural control make it possible to
reduce corruption and increase the efficiency of public procurement? Using a
multitasking agency model, we analyze the interactions between integrity concerns
and the performance objective in public procurement. We show that the effect of
coercive measures on the behavior of the procurer is counterintuitive. The
model explains that the extrinsic formal incentives (control, sanction) are
likely to produce effects far from those sought not only by reducing the effort
to the performance of the buyer but especially by not acting against the
corruption. These findings challenge some beliefs about the effectiveness of
rigid rules and procedures in fighting corruption and improving public
procurement performance.