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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Intertemporal Pricing and Allotment of Sea-cargo Capacity under Reference Effect

  AUTHORS: Xiangzhi Bu, Lei Xu, Li Su

  KEYWORDS: reference effect, anchoring effect, sea-cargo service chain, dynamic pricing, revenue management

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol.1 No.3, December 30, 2008

  ABSTRACT: Reference effect influences the shippers’ purchase behavior to some extent, and it makes shippers’ behavior more mys-terious. Furthermore, it leads to complex to coordinate procurement and pricing of forwarder and carrier. Firstly, we introduce the reference effect into the sea-cargo service supply chain composed with carriers and forwarders, and build the game-theoretical model to decide the optimal contract price and order quantity. Considering the situation where the market demand is affected by current price and reference price, we adopt dynamic programming and classical varia-tion method to analyze the dynamic equilibrium of the game under reference effect with symmetric information or not, respectively. Finally, this paper analyzes the reference effect to price, procurement and profit of carrier with digital analysis.