TITLE:
Service Cooperation Incentive Mechanism in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Service Differentiation
AUTHORS:
Qiaoru Yang, Meng Zhang
KEYWORDS:
Supply Chain, Service Differentiation, Dual-Channel, Incentive Mechanism
JOURNAL NAME:
American Journal of Industrial and Business Management,
Vol.5 No.4,
April
28,
2015
ABSTRACT: The co-principal-anent models of manufacturer and retailer are built under the complete information and asymmetric information. In addition, the optimal profit sharing and the optimal fixed payment ratio are analyzed and compared in both situations. A motivate mechanism about service effort provided by the manufacturer towards the retailer in a dual-channel supply chain is studied. It implies that the profit of manufacturer under asymmetric information decreases dramatically contrasted to complete information and the retailer can gain profits by providing lower services, thus refusing deficiency of the supply chain.