J. Andreoni, “Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2006, pp. 1-22.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00250.x

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Matched Charitable Contributions: Comparative Statics and Equilibrium

  AUTHORS: Daniel K. Biederman

  KEYWORDS: Charitable Contributions; Match Rate; Monotonic Transformation; Nash Equilibrium

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5, October 22, 2013

  ABSTRACT: A small optimizing agent maximizes his utility by allocating his income to private consumption and to a contribution to a particular charity. The agent’s contribution may be matched, at a particular rate, by a large agent. We provide a comprehensive comparative-statics analysis of the agent’s problem, allowing for changes in the agent’s income, the agent’s conjecture about other agents’ contributions, and the match rate. A Nash equilibrium among n such agents is shown to exist if private consumption is a normal good for all agents. The equilibrium is unique if private consumption and charitable giving are normal goods for all agents.