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https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(88)90030-7

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Environmental Policy for Non-Point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly

  AUTHORS: Akio Matsumoto, Keiko Nakayama, Ferenc Szidarovszky

  KEYWORDS: Non-Point Source Pollution, Abatement Technology, Ambient Charge, Bertrand Competition, Two-Stage Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.8 No.5, April 17, 2018

  ABSTRACT: This study investigates the effectiveness of ambient charges under non-point source (NPS) pollutions in an imperfect competition framework. To this end, following Ganguli and Raju, it constructs a one-stage game and a two-stage game in which Bertrand duopolistic firms choose their best prices and abatement technology, respectively. It is demonstrated in both games that an increase in the ambient charge can lead to a decrease in pollution. This finding indicates that the ambient charge can efficiently control pollution in a Bertrand duopoly.