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https://doi.org/10.1162/1542476042782297

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study on the “Cooling” Effect of the Strategy Method on Agent Resentment

  AUTHORS: Jing L. Davis

  KEYWORDS: Strategy Method, Hidden Cost of Controls, Gift-Exchange Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.8 No.5, April 8, 2018

  ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ effort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by principals. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort than without this “cooling” process.