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https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2007.27156438

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Weakening Effect of Executive Overconfidence on Equity Incentive—The Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

  AUTHORS: Sunyu Chen

  KEYWORDS: Executive Overconfidence, Equity Incentives, Risk

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Business and Management, Vol.7 No.1, January 7, 2019

  ABSTRACT: The paper takes Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as samples, to examine the relationship between executive overconfidence and equity incen-tive. Results show that executive overconfidence has a significant weakening effect on equity compensation incentives (including stock options and re-stricted stocks), that is, compared with rational executives, the company will reduce the equity incentives for overconfident executives.