Frank, Ph. (1963). The Pragmatic Components in Carnap’s ‘Elimination of Metaphysics’. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 159-165). La Salle, IL: Open Court.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Formal Logic and Carnap’s Rejection of Metaphysics: A Short Reflection

  AUTHORS: Michael Perrick

  KEYWORDS: Formal Logic, Applied Logic or Epistemology, Rejection of Metaphysics

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.8 No.5, November 29, 2018

  ABSTRACT: From a seemingly impartial, unprejudiced point of view, Carnap claims to be able to eliminate, once and for all, all of metaphysics by “logical analysis”. We argue, on the one hand, that as far as Carnap’s analysis is strictly logical it leaves metaphysics untouched. On the other hand, we argue that as far as his analysis is epistemological it directly hits metaphysics, but lacks the prerogatives of formal logic, especially formal logic’s impartiality.