Kolmar, M. and Rommenswinkel, H. (2013) Contest with Group-Specific Public-Goods and Complementarities in Efforts. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 89, 9-22.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.02.006

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes

  AUTHORS: Jong Hwa Lee

  KEYWORDS: Group-Specific Public-Goods Prize, Endogenous Timing, Free-Rider Problem

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.6, September 29, 2017

  ABSTRACT: I analyze the two-group contest with the group-specific public-goods prize when each player decides on the timing of their moves endogenously and individually. Unlike the previous papers, I show that free riders suffer a damage in the endogenous-timing framework because the decision on the endogenous timing adversely affects the behavior of free riders, by making them more egotistical.