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Article citations


S. Sandri, C. Schade, O. Musshoff and M. Odening, “Holding On for Too Long? An Experimental Study on Inertia in Entrepreneurs’ and Non-Entrepreneurs’ Disinvestment Choices,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 76, No. 1, 2010, pp. 30-44. Hdoi:org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.011

has been cited by the following article:

  • TITLE: Are Business Management Games a Suitable Tool for Analyzing the Boundedly Rational Behavior of Economic Agents?

    AUTHORS: Oliver Musshoff, Norbert Hirschauer, Philipp Hengel

    KEYWORDS: Bounded Rationality, Business Management Games, Multi-Period Linear Programming, Policy Impact Analysis

    JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.2 No.4, September 21, 2011

    ABSTRACT: Regulatory policies often aim to steer the behavior of economic agents by changing their economic environment. Assessing the potential impacts of regulatory policies requires forecasts regarding how humans adapt to such changes. One important prerequisite for meaningful policy impact analysis is in-depth knowledge of why and to what extent economic agents behave in a boundedly rational way. We propose that business management games can be used to contribute towards better understanding of agent behaviors, since they provide an inexpensive opportunity to reach beyond existing anecdotal evidence concerning “behavioral anomalies”. Modifying an existing business management game in which investment, financing and produc tion decisions have to be made, we demonstrate how bounded rationality can be quantified and separated into its two components: incomplete information and limited cognitive abilities. The resulting data show that decisions made by participants in this game are strongly influenced by bounded rationality. They also show that both incomplete information and limited cognitive abilities are relevant components of the bounded rationality displayed by players.