Cardinaels, E and Yin, H. (2015) Think Twice before Going for Incentives: Social Norms and the Principal’s Decision on Compensation Contracts. The Accounting Review, 53, 985-1015.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12093

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: A Reexamination of “The Hidden Return to Incentives”

  AUTHORS: Jing Davis, Steven Schwartz, Richard Young

  KEYWORDS: Incentives, Trust Game, Gift-Exchange Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.5, August 18, 2017

  ABSTRACT: Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.