The RSA Cryptographic Protocol Is Not Secure
Cristian Dumitrescu
Kitchener, Canada.
DOI: 10.4236/am.2013.412222   PDF    HTML     3,243 Downloads   4,759 Views  


In this article I describe a randomized algorithm based on random walks with two absorbing barriers that solves the satisfiability problem (known to be NP complete) with arbitrary high probability. As a consequence of this algorithm, I also prove that the RSA cryptographic protocol is not secure.

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Dumitrescu, C. (2013) The RSA Cryptographic Protocol Is Not Secure. Applied Mathematics, 4, 1635-1636. doi: 10.4236/am.2013.412222.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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[2] W. Feller, “An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications,” John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1968.
[3] L. Fortnow, “The Golden Ticket, P, NP, and the Search for the Impossible,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2013.
[4] C. H. Papadimitriou, “On Selecting a Satisfying Truth Assignment,” Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, San Juan, 1-4 October 1991, pp. 163-169.

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