Labor Investment in a New International Mixed Market


This paper considers a continuous-time dynamic mixed market model of labor investment decisions of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm. The paper studies the optimal levels of preemptive investment for the long-run structure of the international mixed market. It is then demonstrated that there are no perfect equilibria in which neither firm invests to its steady-state reaction curve.

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K. Ohnishi, "Labor Investment in a New International Mixed Market," Technology and Investment, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2010, pp. 143-148. doi: 10.4236/ti.2010.12017.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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