Multicriteria Partial Cooperative Games

Graziano Pieri¹, Lucia Pusillo^2*

¹Department of Science for Architecture (DSA), Stradone S. Agostino, Genoa, Italy.
²Department of Mathematics (DIMA), University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy.

DOI: 10.4236/am.2015.612186                

Abstract

In this paper, we study an approach to environmental topics, through multicriteria partial cooperative games. In general, not all players wish to cooperate to solve a common problem, so we consider a model where only some decision-makers cooperate. Starting from the transformation of a coalition game into a strategic one, we give a new concept of solution for partial cooperative models proving an existence theorem.

Keywords

Non Cooperative Games, TU-Games, Strong Nash Equilibrium, Pareto Equilibrium, Environmental Models

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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