The RSA Cryptographic Protocol Is Not Secure ()
Abstract
In this article I describe a randomized algorithm based
on random walks with two absorbing barriers that solves the satisfiability
problem (known to be NP complete) with arbitrary high probability. As a
consequence of this algorithm, I also prove that the RSA cryptographic protocol
is not secure.
Share and Cite:
Dumitrescu, C. (2013) The RSA Cryptographic Protocol Is Not Secure.
Applied Mathematics,
4, 1635-1636. doi:
10.4236/am.2013.412222.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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