Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents

DOI: 10.4236/me.2013.41002   PDF   HTML   XML   4,855 Downloads   6,811 Views   Citations

Abstract

Patent pools are established by the patent holders in order to promote R & D and technological standards, etc. This paper investigates the patent holders’ incentive to form a patent pool, the patent pool’s licensing behavior, and the anticompetitive effect of a patent pool. Our model is characterized by the following two features. First, we consider the different two types of patent: basic and optional. Second, we consider a patent pool that offers two types of a package license: single and multiple. Our results yield some implications for a patent pool that is characterized by the complementarity between basic and optional patents.

Share and Cite:

K. Azetsu and S. Yamada, "Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents," Modern Economy, Vol. 4 No. 1, 2013, pp. 10-19. doi: 10.4236/me.2013.41002.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

[1] M. Heller and R. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,” Science, Vol. 280, No. 5364, 1998, pp. 698-701.
[2] C. Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standardsetting,” In: C. Shapiro, A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern, Eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 119-150.
[3] R. Gilbert, “Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution,” Stanford Technology Law Review 3, 2004.
[4] J. Lerner and J. Tirole, “Efficient Patent Pools,” American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, 2004, pp. 691-711. doi:10.1257/0002828041464641
[5] K. Azetsu and S. Yamada, “Package Licenses in Patent Pools,” Kobe University Economic Review 57, 2011.
[6] J. Lerner and J. Tirole, “Public Policy toward Patent Pools,” In: A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern, Eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 157-186.
[7] R. Aoki and S. Nagaoka, “The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools,” The Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2004, pp. 345-356.
[8] S. Brenner, “Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools,” Economic Theory, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2009, pp. 373-388. doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0379-z
[9] C. Langinier, “Patent Pool Formation and Scope of Patents,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2009, pp. 959-1122.
[10] United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,” 1995. Http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
[11] G. Priest, “Cartels and Patent License Arrangements,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1977, pp. 309-377. doi:10.1086/466905
[12] M. L. Katz and C. Shapiro, “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility,” American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1985, pp. 424-440.
[13] J. Church and N. Gandal, “Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization,” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1992, pp. 85-103.
[14] J. Church and N. Gandal, “Complementary Network Externalities and Technological Adoption,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1993, pp. 239-260.
[15] J. Lerner, M. Strojwas, and J. Tirole, “Cooperative Marketing Agreements between Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, Cambridge, 2003, Article ID: 9680.
[16] Europe Committee, “Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements,” 2004. http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0002:0042:EN:PDF.
[17] B. Salanie, “The Economics of Contracts,” MIT Press, Cambridge, 2002.
[18] P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, “Contract Theory, Cambridge,” MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005.
[19] W. Adams and J. Yellen, “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 3, 1976, pp. 475-498.
[20] R. McAfee, J. McMillan and M. Whinston, “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No. 2, 1989, pp. 371-383. doi:10.2307/2937852
[21] T. Adachi, J. Ebina and M. Hanazono, “Option Package Bundling,” KIER Discussion Paper, Kyoto University, Kyoto, 2011.
[22] M. Spence, “Nonlinear Prices and Welfare,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-18.
[23] E. Maskin and J. Riley, “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1984, pp. 171-196.

  
comments powered by Disqus

Copyright © 2020 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work and the related PDF file are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.