[1]
|
G. Corneo and R. Rob, “Working in Public and Private Firms,” Journal of Public Economic, Vol. 87, No. 12, 2003, pp. 1335-1352.
doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00199-2
|
[2]
|
A. Dixit, “Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, 1997, pp. 378-382.
|
[3]
|
A. Dixit, “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review,” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2002, pp. 696-727.
doi:10.2307/3069614
|
[4]
|
D. Martimout, “Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 88, No. 2, 1999, pp. 261-293. doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2556
|
[5]
|
A. Roberts, “Performance-Based Organizations: Assessing the Gore Plan,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 57, No. 6, 1997, pp. 465-478. doi:10.2307/976958
|
[6]
|
D. Marsden and R. Richardson, “Performing for Pay? The Effects of ‘Merit Pay’ on Motivation in a Public Service,” British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1994, pp. 243-261.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8543.1994.tb01043.x
|
[7]
|
S. Martin and D. Parker, “The Impact of Privatization: Ownership and Corporate Performance in the UK,” Routledge, London, 1997. doi:10.4324/9780203439012
|
[8]
|
D. Bos, “Privatization and Restructuring: An Incomplete-contract Approach,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 155, No. 2, 1999, pp. 362-382.
|
[9]
|
O. Hart, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, 1997, pp. 1127-1161. doi:10.1162/003355300555448
|
[10]
|
K. M. Schmidt, “Incomplete Contracts and Privatization,” European Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1996, pp. 569-579. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00070-4
|
[11]
|
K. M. Schmidt, “The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach,” Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1-24. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023354
|
[12]
|
M. Boycko, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, “A Theory of Privatization,” Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435, 1996, pp. 309-319. doi: 10.2307/2235248
|
[13]
|
B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom, “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2, 1987, pp. 303-328.
doi:10.2307/1913238
|
[14]
|
A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4, 1994, pp. 995-1025. doi:10.2307/2118354
|
[15]
|
W. Megginson, R. Nash and M. Randenborgh, “The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1994, pp. 403-452.
doi:10.2307/2329158
|
[16]
|
J.Q. Wilson, “Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It,” Basic Books, New York, 1989.
|