Share This Article:

Weakly Stable Sets of NTU Game

DOI: 10.4236/ajor.2012.21010    4,097 Downloads   6,598 Views   Citations

ABSTRACT

In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

H. Qiao and H. Gao, "Weakly Stable Sets of NTU Game," American Journal of Operations Research, Vol. 2 No. 1, 2012, pp. 91-93. doi: 10.4236/ajor.2012.21010.

References

[1] R. J. Aumann, “An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value,” Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1985, pp. 599-612. doi:10.2307/1911657
[2] U. Faigle and W. Kern, “The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992, pp. 249- 266. doi:10.1007/BF01258278
[3] J. V. Neumann and O. Morgenstern, “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944.
[4] H. W. Gao, “On the Weakly Stable Sets of Cooperative Games,” Journal of Qingdao University, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1998, pp. 1-5.
[5] P. E. M. Borm and S. H. Tijs, “Strategic Claim Games Corresponding to an NTU-Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1992, pp. 58-71. doi:10.1016/0899-8256(92)90005-D
[6] J. C. Harsanyi, “A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game,” International Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1963, pp. 194-207. doi:10.2307/2525487
[7] L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, “On Market Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969, pp. 9-25. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(69)90008-8
[8] E. Kalai and D. Samet, “Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1985, pp. 41-50. doi:10.1007/BF01770226
[9] M. Maschler and G. Owen, “The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments,” In: R. Selten, Ed., Rational Interaction, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992, pp. 5-12.
[10] S. Hart, “A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values,” Theory and Decision, Vol. 56, No.1-2, 2004, pp. 35- 46. doi:10.1007/s11238-004-5633-7
[11] R. P. Lejano, “A Note on Solution Concepts for Nontransferable Utility Games,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 47, No. 6, 2011, pp. 777-780. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.001

  
comments powered by Disqus

Copyright © 2019 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work and the related PDF file are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.