Author(s)

Jundong Qiu

School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.

There is a correlation between the price of rent and the supply and demand of housing leases. While the government promotes financial innovation in the leasing market, there are also loopholes in financial supervision, which causes social forces to excessively participate in the “profit-seeking” behavior of housing leasing projects, further resulting in rising rental prices. Finally, this makes the public cannot afford housing. Based on the evolution game theory, this paper analyzes the evolutionary path and mechanism of government and social forces in repeated games. The results show that it is difficult for social forces to evolve naturally to non-participation without external forces, and the government needs to implement appropriate regulations to make the system evolve toward the target state.

Social Forces, Housing Rental Projects, Macro Control, Game of Evolution

Qiu, J. (2020) The Game of Social Forces Participating in the Evolution of the Housing Rental Market and Government Regulation. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 10, 99-109. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2020.101007.