The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility ()
ABSTRACT
In this paper I
argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is
satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle
of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear
how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral
responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to
satisfy PAPR.
Share and Cite:
Alexander, L. (2014) The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility.
Open Journal of Philosophy,
4, 141-143. doi:
10.4236/ojpp.2014.42019.
Cited by
No relevant information.