Can Bailout Improve the Economic Welfare? A Structural Derivation of the Option Price ()
ABSTRACT
We developed a game-theoretic approach
concerning the option pricing validity and tractability of which is ascertained
by deriving the Black-Scholes formula. We also applied this approach to the
welfare implications of the bailout policy. It is found that such a policy
always worsens the economic welfare. This is because of the moral hazardous behavior
of the buyer owing to the limited liability which is emphasized, for example,
by Arrow [1] and Stiglitz and Weiss [2].
Share and Cite:
Otaki, M. (2013) Can Bailout Improve the Economic Welfare? A Structural Derivation of the Option Price.
Theoretical Economics Letters,
3, 105-107. doi:
10.4236/tel.2013.32017.
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