Author(s)

Stelian Mădălin Mihai

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania.

In this paper, I am going to explore an alternative explanation of causation in Graham Priest’s modal meinongianism. Priest proposes an understanding of causation, which is either too confusing, or against the metaphysical core of modal meinongianism. In his proposals, causation is discussed in the context of defining purely fictional and abstract objects, by using a counterfactual approach. In this case, causation is understood as an existence-entailing relation. I will argue that such an account of causation proves ineffective. Instead, I will give another interpretation for causation, which is based on Peter Menzies and Huw Price’s version of agency theory of causation. My interest in studying such a particular subject is to find an answer which is to be used in a further research. The end result of my work will be the fact that causation as agency can, at best, be useful in understanding intentional acts, but not suitable for explaining what it means for a particular object to causally interact with us.

Possible Worlds, Impossible Worlds, Causation, Agency, Fictional, Abstract

Mihai, S. M. (2024) Causation as Agency in Modal Meinongianism. Open Journal of Philosophy, 14, 805-819. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2024.144054.