The Road to Re-Election: Incumbency, Wear and Tear of Power and New Tactics ()
ABSTRACT
Incumbency is frequently said to advantage re-election seeker incumbents,
but incumbency disadvantage can also be highlighted in some countries in
several kinds of electoral contexts. This paper takes a theoretical point of
view and aims at shedding light on the capacity to remain in power and on the
mechanisms at stake. In an
electoral competition framework with election seeker politicians, contributing
lobbies and voters divided into informed and non-informed voters, this paper
analyzes the dynamics of political support in a two-period
model. It is shown that the dynamics of electoral promises with two groups
competing for political favor generates a mechanical downward trend of
political support. This trend creates an incentive not to campaign on
re-election about a balance sheet of the ending mandate but rather to campaign
on new projects or new themes not connected to those of the previous election
campaign or even to bring new tactics onto the political scene (including the
promotion of voters’ misinformation).
Share and Cite:
Lagadec, G. (2022) The Road to Re-Election: Incumbency, Wear and Tear of Power and New Tactics.
Theoretical Economics Letters,
12, 1452-1471. doi:
10.4236/tel.2022.125079.
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