The Tunneling of State-Owned Controlling Shareholders and the Incentive of Professional Manager in the Mixed Ownership Reform of Chinese ()
ABSTRACT
This paper breaks through the relationship between
the administrative appointment manager and the State-Owned controlling
shareholders, through taking the professional managers with fairness preferences
into the State-owned enterprises corporate governance framework. It finds
that the equity incentive for the manager will not affect the tunneling
behavior of state-owned controlling shareholders in the State-owned enterprise
which is administrative, but the equity incentive for the Professional Managers
with fairness preferences can restrain the tunneling of State-Owned controlling
shareholders to a certain degree. And that a more perfect legal supervision can
also restrain the tunneling of State-Owned controlling shareholders. Finally,
main strategies for government were suggested, including developing
professional manager market, establishing an institution of professional
managers, establishing a fair and open competition environment in the market, and making a more perfect legal
supervision.
Share and Cite:
Zhao, C. and Peng, H. (2018) The Tunneling of State-Owned Controlling Shareholders and the Incentive of Professional Manager in the Mixed Ownership Reform of Chinese.
Modern Economy,
9, 1839-1852. doi:
10.4236/me.2018.911116.