Environmental Policies and Firm Behavior with Endogenous Investment in R & D ()
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates upon the optimal amount of oil usage in an economy characterized by competitive firms and by a monopolistic innovator. It is close in spirit to Denicolo 1999 and Parry 2003. There are two alternative oil saving technologies: the conventional one is promptly available to firms while the advanced one, providing more efficiency in oil saving, must be paid to the monopolistic innovator. By assuming that innovation follows a Poisson process, whose arrival rate depends on the amount of resources invested in R & D, we show that central authority provides higher level of social welfare than market instruments.
Share and Cite:
E. Gaeta, "Environmental Policies and Firm Behavior with Endogenous Investment in R & D,"
Technology and Investment, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2010, pp. 77-84. doi:
10.4236/ti.2010.12009.
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