Author(s)

Guxing Chen

School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.

Anscombe’s practical knowledge remains a hotly debated topic in the philosophy of action. Anscombe herself posits that when an agent performs an action intentionally, they are aware of doing so without the need for observation, underscoring the non-observational essence of practical knowledge. However, skepticism challenges this view, questioning whether practical knowledge persists in instances of action failure. Anscombe affirms it does, a stance that puzzles many scholars. This paper defends the non-observational nature of practical knowledge from two angles: Firstly, it distinguishes between practical and speculative knowledge by highlighting that practical knowledge catalyzes intentional action, making it the formal cause. This implies that practical knowledge’s validity is independent of the action’s outcome, thus rendering action failure irrelevant to its existence. Secondly, intentional action is characterized more as a continuum than a discrete event. Therefore, interruptions or failures do not denote the end but a continuation of the action process, allowing the notion of failure to be reconsidered within the broader framework of ongoing action.

Intentional Action, Practical Knowledge, Non-Observational Knowledge, Formal Cause, Process, Event

Chen, G. (2024) On the Non-Observational Character of Practical Knowledge. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 12, 1-9. doi: 10.4236/jss.2024.123001.