Theoretical Economics Letters

Volume 12, Issue 6 (December 2022)

ISSN Print: 2162-2078   ISSN Online: 2162-2086

Google-based Impact Factor: 1.34  Citations  

Trustless, Permissionless, Non-Custodial Stablecoins in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO)

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2022.126085    215 Downloads   2,280 Views  Citations

ABSTRACT

The benefits offered by cryptocurrencies are a great many: transaction cost and speed, security and transparency, to name a few. Yet, there is also a major drawback represented by their extremely high volatility. Stablecoins offer an ideal solution since they preserve all the advantages of blockchain-based currencies, while reducing considerably the volatility issue. Currently, stablecoins are almost exclusively pegged to the US Dollar and secured by non-crypto assets held in account at custodial institutions. In this article, we present the design of a decentralized organization aimed at issuing stablecoins backed by crypto-assets stored on-chain and pegged to assets different from fiat money. Our model offers several advantages, in particular, it allows the issuance of stablecoins in a trustless, permission-less and non-custodial environment.

Share and Cite:

Castello, A. and Gadzinski, G. (2022) Trustless, Permissionless, Non-Custodial Stablecoins in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO). Theoretical Economics Letters, 12, 1559-1565. doi: 10.4236/tel.2022.126085.

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