The Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Intellectual Property Protection with Government Participation ()
ABSTRACT
As society continues to develop, intellectual
property rights are becoming more and more important and play an important role
in promoting economic development and other aspects. Intellectual property
rights are not only important for enterprises, but also indispensable for the
existence of government work. Based on the theoretical framework of
evolutionary game, this paper constructs a three-party game model with the
government, innovation subjects and stealers as the main players, analyzes the
evolutionary stabilization strategies of each participant, and conducts
numerical simulations on this basis to further explore the key influencing
factors of government administrative punishment, subsidies and the cost of
innovation subjects in defending their rights. The results show that the three
parties of the game reach strategic equilibrium when the innovative subject
chooses to defend its rights, the government chooses to conduct strict
regulation strategy, and the stealer chooses to conduct infringement behavior.
For the influence of key factors, when the administrative penalties charged by
the government for infringement increase and the subsidies to innovative
subjects increase, it will lead to an increase in the probability of
enterprises to defend their rights and a decrease in the probability of
stealers to infringe; while the increase in the cost of innovative subjects
suffering from infringement at the time of defense will lead to a decrease in
the probability of innovative subjects to defend their rights and an increase
in the probability of stealers to infringe.
Share and Cite:
Ma, X. (2022) The Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Intellectual Property Protection with Government Participation.
Open Journal of Business and Management,
10, 2790-2804. doi:
10.4236/ojbm.2022.105138.
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