Author(s)

Xin Wang

Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China.

Based on Anomie theory and actual revenue management theory, this paper explores the relationship between R&D investment and short-term investment after administrative change/mandatory change. It is found that administrative change/mandatory change can significantly reduce R&D investment, and executive change can be significantly changed. Increasing short-term investments and mandatory changes in executives can significantly increase short-term investments. In addition, mandatory changes in executives can significantly reduce a company’s R&D investment. Successful sources can mitigate this relationship between administrative changes/mandatory changes and corporate R&D investments, and short-term investments in companies with executive change/mandatory changes. External successors will weaken changes/mandatory changes to R&D investments, while internal successors will enhance the impact of change/mandatory changes on R&D investment. At the same time, external successors will reduce the positive impact of change/mandatory changes on short-term investments, and internal successors will enhance the positive impact of change/mandatory changes on short-term investments.

Top Management Change, Succession Source, Enterprise Risk Decision Tendencies

Wang, X. (2019) Top Management Change, Succession Source and Enterprise Risk Decision Tendencies. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 7, 215-233. doi: 10.4236/jss.2019.711015.