Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents - Modern Economy

ME > Vol.4 No.1, January 2013

Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents ()

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Download as PDF (Size: 231KB) PP. 10-19

DOI: 10.4236/me.2013.41002 5,392 Downloads 7,712 Views Citations

Author(s)

Kenji Azetsu, Seiji Yamada

Affiliation(s)

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, The University of Kitakyusyu, Kitakyushu, Japan.
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan.

ABSTRACT

Patent pools are established by the patent holders in order to promote R & D and technological standards, etc. This paper investigates the patent holders’ incentive to form a patent pool, the patent pool’s licensing behavior, and the anticompetitive effect of a patent pool. Our model is characterized by the following two features. First, we consider the different two types of patent: basic and optional. Second, we consider a patent pool that offers two types of a package license: single and multiple. Our results yield some implications for a patent pool that is characterized by the complementarity between basic and optional patents.

KEYWORDS

Basic and Optional Patents; Patent Pools; Patent Pool Pricing; Single and Multiple Package Licenses

Share and Cite:

K. Azetsu and S. Yamada, "Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents," Modern Economy, Vol. 4 No. 1, 2013, pp. 10-19. doi: 10.4236/me.2013.41002.

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