Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.2 No.3(2012), Paper ID 21517, 7 pages



Optimal Costly Information Gathering in Public Service Provision


Paul Geertsema, Christoph Schumacher


School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand


Copyright © 2012 Paul Geertsema, Christoph Schumacher et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


How to Cite this Article

Geertsema, P. and Schumacher, C. (2012) Optimal Costly Information Gathering in Public Service Provision. Theoretical Economics Letters, 2, 330-336. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.23060.

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