Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.2 No.3(2012), Paper ID 21517, 7 pages

DOI:10.4236/tel.2012.23060

 

Optimal Costly Information Gathering in Public Service Provision

 

Paul Geertsema, Christoph Schumacher

 

School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

 

Copyright © 2012 Paul Geertsema, Christoph Schumacher et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

How to Cite this Article


P. Geertsema and C. Schumacher, "Optimal Costly Information Gathering in Public Service Provision," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 3, 2012, pp. 330-336. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.23060.

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