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When the Need for Cognitive Structure does not Cause Heuristic Thinking: The Moderating Effect of the Perceived Ability to Achieve Cognitive Structure

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DOI: 10.4236/psych.2010.12013    4,756 Downloads   8,778 Views   Citations
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ABSTRACT

This research explores the hypothesis that the relationship between need for cognitive structure (NCS) and the use of cognitive biases is moderated by the perceived ability to achieve cognitive structure (AACS). NCS is defined as the extent of preference to use cognitive structuring vs. piecemeal processing as a means to achieve certainty. AACS refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they are able to use information processing processes (cognitive structuring or piecemeal) that are consistent with their level of NCS. To examine this hypothesis, Study 1 explored the effect of the NCS by AACS interaction on the use of confirmation bias. Study 2, demonstrated this effect on the use of framing heuristic. The results of the two studies confirm the hypothesis.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Bar-Tal, Y. (2010). When the Need for Cognitive Structure does not Cause Heuristic Thinking: The Moderating Effect of the Perceived Ability to Achieve Cognitive Structure. Psychology, 1, 96-105. doi: 10.4236/psych.2010.12013.

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