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https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511610240.006

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism

  AUTHORS: Naoki Kojima

  KEYWORDS: Multi-Dimensional Mechanism, Indirect Mechanism, Budget Constraint, Revelation Principle

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.2, February 27, 2017

  ABSTRACT: The present paper investigates the multi-dimensional mechanism design in which buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal direct mechanism by a one-dimensional indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional setting, i.e., function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. It also sheds light on where the difficulty lies implementability of a general direct mechanism—not optimal—by a canonical mechanism.