J. Serv. Sci. & Management, 2008,1: 226-232
Published Online December 2008 in SciRes (www.SciRP.org/journal/jssm)
1
A Way to Improve Knowledge Sharing: from the
Perspective of Knowledge Potential
Lingling Zhang
1,2*
, Xiuyu Zheng
1,2
, Jun Li
1,2
, Guangli Nie
1,2
, Guoqing Huo
1
& Yong Shi
2,3
1
School of Management, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing (100190), China,
2
Research Centre on
Fictitious Economy and Data Science, CAS, Beijing (100190), China,
3
College of Information Science and Technology, University
of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68118, USA.
Received April 18
th
, 2008; revised October 29
th
, 2008; accepted November 19
th
, 2008.
ABSTRACT
Knowledge is the most important resource in an organization, and the knowledge transfer and sharing between
employees is of vital importance for organizations. “Prisoner’s dilemma” exists in the process of the organizational
knowledge transfer and sharing when the employees transfer their knowledge to the organization and share their
knowledge with other employees. This paper analyzes the process and obstacle of the knowledge transfer and sharing in
the organization and studies the game model of the knowledge transfer and sharing, and put forward the conclusion
that different knowledge potential employees should be stimulated by different measures. Through analyzing
principle-agent in the incentive mechanism, introducing the equity incentive method will have infinitely repeated games
to the knowledge high-potential employees who are the key sources of the knowledge transfer and sharing in the
incentive mechanism design. This makes it possible to break the prisoner's dilemma of the knowledge transfer and
sharing.
Keywords: knowledge potential, knowledge sharing, knowledge transfer, incentive mechanism, game theory
1. Introduction
In the era of knowledge economy, knowledge has
become important resource and the most crucial strategy
elements in an organization. Many researchers have
pointed out that knowledge transfer and sharing among
employees would lead to faster responses to customer
requirement at a lower cost in operations. The knowledge
creation and the ability to apply knowledge are the most
important sources of the sustainable competitive advantage
in an organization [1,2]. Knowledge has a characteristic
which is the same as the currency, i.e. people can’t find
its value unless it is used or transmitted. The knowledge
is useful only when it becomes social sharing [3,4]. In
other words, knowledge develops in the communication
and value-added in the use.
Knowledge may be held by one person or embedded in
organizational employees. Knowledge between employees is
complementary [5,6], so knowledge transfer and sharing is
propitious to the employees’ knowledge richness and
growth. However, due to organizational culture environment,
incentive mechanisms, the characteristics of the
knowledge and other reasons, knowledge transfer and
sharing between the employees and the organization
often get into prisoner’s dilemma. Researches indicate
that the quality of the employee can only play to
20%-30% in the environment of lack of incentives, but in
a good incentive environment the same person can play a
potential of 80%-90%, which indicate that 50%-60% of
the gap is caused by incentives.
Currently, the incentive of knowledge transfer and
sharing based on principal-agent is mainly in two aspects.
On the one hand is the tacit incentive method to solve the
agency problem. On the other hand is the explicit
incentive method to solve the agency problem. Propose
incentive measures based on the information asymmetry
model in the principal-agent relationship and put the
residual distribution to link to the operating performance.
Since the 1980s, economics introduce dynamic game
theory to principal-agent relationship and demonstrate in
the repeatedly agency relationship circumstances, the
tacit incentive mechanism of competition, reputation and
so on can encourage the agents, which enrich the
incentive theoretical content in the long-term principal-
agent relationship.
It is evident that organizational knowledge seems to be
highly relevant to organizations to achieve sustainable
advantages. As for this problem, the following approaches
are mostly adopted in the previous study at home and
abroad: 1) To expand game to the N-person prisoners’
dilemma, and set up the utility functions and organization
scale of the players so as to study the cooperation of
organization through computer simulating the process of

A Way to Improve Knowledge Sharing: from the Perspective of Knowledge Potential 227
the game [7] To introduce the model of infinitely repeated
game and to institute the rules of knowledge transfer and
sharing based on the experimental results of AXELROD
so as to find out solutions [8,9,10]. The limitations of the
previous studies are as follows:
1) The study is mainly focused on the analysis of the
game model, and specific and feasible solutions suitable
for corporations haven’t been given.
2) Research is generally confined to break “prisoner
dilemma” between the employees and the organization or
between the employees, not having a good combination
of them to analysis.
3) The utility function of the players is a specific
function supposed by the writer, which cannot reflect the
effect of knowledge sharing on the players fully and
exactly.
In this paper we focus on the different knowledge
potential of the employees in the organization, combining
knowledge transfer and sharing between the employees
and the organization to analysis, and design incentive
mechanisms for the different employees which enable the
employees and organization to achieve a win-win
situation. The results demonstrate research on improving
efficiency of organizational knowledge transfer and
sharing based on knowledge potential is effective.
The rest part of this paper is organized as follows. The
analysis of obstacles of knowledge transfer and sharing in
the organization is presented in the next section. In
Section 3, the game model of the knowledge transfer and
sharing is described. Research on incentive mechanisms
in knowledge transfer and sharing is discussed in Section
4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the
implications and limitations of this study, research
directions, and concluding remarks.
2. The Analysis of Obstacles of Knowledge
Transfer and Sharing in the Organization
A large number of scholars emphasize the importance of
knowledge transfer and sharing in many related areas.
According to the view of some scholars, the ability to
transfer knowledge is a system which is superior to other
arrangements such as unique source of market organizational
competitive advantage [2]. An effective knowledge
transfer and sharing is considered to be the key to a series
organizational process and results, including best practice
transfer, new product development, learning speed and
organizational survival. So how to promote the
employees in the organization to transfer and share
knowledge is an important research topic. Knowledge
transfer and sharing cannot progress naturally in an
organization. In addition to the organizational structure,
enterprise culture and the application of information
technology etc external factors, the most important part is
still its internal factors.
The knowledge has the characteristics of public
property [11,12], the high cost production, the use of
non-exclusive, but low dissemination cost. Once the
knowledge is transferred or shared, its exclusive rights
will be lost, while the exclusive rights are always the
embodiment of the employees’ values in the enterprises
as well as guarantee of the security of their occupations.
In the process of knowledge transfer and sharing, the
employees obtain profits while they pay cost, therefore,
employees’ utility can be regarded as the difference
between the gained profits and the costs. The employees
are concerned that sharing knowledge has negative
effects which will reduce their original knowledge value
and undermine the competitiveness in the organization.
Thus, when the employee cannot access to others’
exclusive knowledge or hasn’t got any compensation, his
proceeds will be negative. The employee will lose his
special value in the organization because of losing the
exclusivity of knowledge. Because the employees’ core
knowledge is always tacit, the knowledge sharing must
be based on a voluntary basis. So there are few people
who are willing to share their core knowledge with others,
which create the knowledge sharing barriers.
3. The Game Model of the Knowledge Transfer
and Sharing
3.1. Knowledge Transfer between the Employees
and the Organization
In the organization there are two forms in the knowledge
transfer and sharing, one is between the employee and the
organization, the other is between the employees. If all
the employees are willing to transfer and share their own
knowledge, not only the employees will raise their
knowledge and skills, but also it’s useful for the
organization. The decisive factors to the quality and
effectiveness of knowledge transfer and sharing are the
subjective desire of the knowledge owner. As the
organizations are unable to observe and measure the
employees’ knowledge sharing, so there are games exist
between the employees and the organization. Assuming.
k
: Knowledge volume of the employees transfer and
sharing.
W
: The incentive costs which organizations pay to the
employees under encouragement.
( )
C k
: The costs of employees’ knowledge transfer. It
refers to the fact that the knowledge receivers pay out the
amount of time, energy and opportunity cost during the
knowledge transfer, and knowledge owners pay out time,
energy and the loss of competitive advantages due to
knowledge transfer and sharing.
( )
k
π : The output of knowledge transfer and sharing to
the organization.
As the employees’ knowledge transfer and sharing is
highly difficult to detect in the organizations, so the

228 Lingling Zhang, Xiuyu Zheng, Jun Li, Guangli Nie, Guoqing Huo & Yong Shi
organizations cannot pay out the incentive costs according
to the volume of knowledge transfer, but can only to
decide to take incentive methods or not. Employees’
knowledge transfer costs and the outputs of knowledge
transfer and sharing to the organization are the function
of knowledge volume of the employees transfer and
sharing. Therefore, the game matrix of the employees and
the organization is as table1 shown:
From the above game matrix we can easily draw the
conclusion that the best choice to the organization is not
to pay out incentive costs and to the employee is not to
transfer knowledge, so (not encourage, not transfer) is
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, even the knowledge
transfer and sharing is both good for the organization and
employees, the game of the employees’ knowledge
transfer to the organizational knowledge still traps in the
prisoner’s dilemma.
3.2. Knowledge Sharing between the Employee s
According to the situation of knowledge transfer and
sharing in the organization the knowledge can be divided
into two categories: the transferable knowledge and the
non-transferable knowledge [13,14].
Assuming the employee A and B process the game of
knowledge sharing in the organization, they are all
rational players and the knowledge they transferred and
shared is useful to the organization. Each of them has two
choices, to share knowledge or not to share knowledge.
Assuming:
1 1
,
A B
U U
: Respectively represent the non-transferable
knowledge of the player A and B.
2 2
,
A B
U U
: Respectively represent the transferable
knowledge of the player A and B.
3 3
,
A B
U U
: Respectively represent the synergy value of
the player A and B in the knowledge sharing. Synergy
value is the newly acquired knowledge value by virtue of
the fusion of special knowledge when both sides share
their knowledge [15].
4 4
,
A B
U U
: Respectively represent
the multiplication value of the player A and B in the
knowledge sharing. Multiplication value is the capacity
of the knowledge receivers using the knowledge
suppliers’ knowledge to improve their own competitive
advantages [15].
Table 1. The game matrix of the employees and
organization
Employee
Organization
Transfer Not Transfer
Encourage
(( ),( ))
kW WCk
π
− −
(, )
W W
−
Not
Encourage
(( ),( ))
kCk
π
−
(0,0)
5 5
,
A B
U U
: The negative utility to the knowledge
suppliers due to the knowledge transfer and sharing.
,
A B
α α
: Respectively represent the knowledge
absorptive capacity coefficient of the player A and B.
Therefore, the profit matrix as Table 2 shown:
M. Levy. find that low synergy value is not related to
high multiplication value, but synergy value is linked to
the negative effects through a group of organizations’
empirical research. Therefore, the game results showed
two cases as follows:
a. Prisoner’s dilemma. When the generated synergy
value of the knowledge sharing is lower than its negative
effects, that is when
3 5
A A
U U
< and
3 5
B B
U U
< , (not-
sharing, not-sharing) is the only Nash equilibrium. The
two players are in Prisoner’s dilemma.
b. Trust game. When the generated synergy value of
the knowledge sharing is higher than its negative effects,
that is when
3 5
A A
U U
> and
3 5
B B
U U
> , there are two
equilibriums (sharing, sharing) and (non-sharing, non-
sharing). At this point, there is first-mover advantage.
The player adopts a wait-and-see attitude, whose revenue
maximization strategy is making the same choice to the other.
From the above process of game we can see, the best
choices of the play A and B are all non-sharing, so
(non-sharing, non-sharing) is a Nash equilibrium. The
dilemma of knowledge sharing reflects the contradictions
of individual rationality and collective rationality, and the
appeared optimal strategy to individuals will make the
entire organization in a disadvantageous position.
Therefore, the organizations need to establish an effective
mechanism of knowledge sharing to break this
“dilemma”.
4. Research on Incentive Mechanisms in
Knowledge Transfer and Sharing
4.1. Subject and Knowledge Potential in the
Knowledge Transfer and Sharing
In organization the knowledge quantity of the employees
is different. Someone has the low potential knowledge,
and someone has the high potential knowledge. Therefore,
knowledge transfer and sharing is a tripartite game process
of the knowledge suppliers, receivers and organizations.
The position of the subject is not all the same in the
Table 2. The game matrix of knowledge sharing
Player B
Player A
Sharing Not-sharing
Sharing
2 345
2 34 5
( ,
)
A BAAA
BA B BB
UUU U
UUU U
α
α
+ +−
+ +−
52 4
( ,)
AB AB
UU U α − +
Not-sharing
2 4 5
(, )
A BAB
U U U α + −
(0,0)

A Way to Improve Knowledge Sharing: from the Perspective of Knowledge Potential 229
JSSM
Figure 1. Ypes of the knowledge employees
knowledge sharing process. The employees can be
divided into four types according to the knowledge
potential level and mobility of the employees as Figure1
shown. The organization must recognize the quadrant of
the employees in the incentive mechanism design of
knowledge transfer and sharing, the adopted incentive
mechanism to different employees should be different.
4.2. Organizational Knowledge Transfer and
Sharing Flow Map based on the Knowledge
Potential
In the organizational knowledge transfer and sharing, the
organizations are clients who must make games with one
or more agents namely employees. As the employees
have different knowledge quantity, the design of incentive
mechanism to high-potential knowledge employees and
low-potential knowledge employees should be different.
Because the key to the knowledge sharing lies in the
willingness of high-potential knowledge employees’
sharing his personal core knowledge, the mechanism design
to the high-potential knowledge employees is the key.
Figure 2 shows the knowledge transfer and sharing
flow map between the employees and organization. It can
be seen there are two main paths to achieve the
employees’ knowledge transferring to the organizational
knowledge, respectively ① and ② of Figure 2. So in
this process the key knowledge source is the high-
potential knowledge employees. The most important
point to the knowledge transfer and sharing is the
willingness and ability of the employee dispersing his
individual knowledge.
After breaking the “prisoner’s dilemma” of high-
potential knowledge employees’ knowledge transferring
to the organizational knowledge, the knowledge sharing
between the employees has become simple. In Figure 2,
if the high-potential knowledge employees are voluntary
to transfer and share knowledge, not only path ① can be
achieved, but also can promote path ② completed
through the high-potential knowledge employees
transferring knowledge to the low-potential knowledge
employees.
4.3. The Premise and Assumption
If the employees in the organization could transfer and share
Figure 2. Organizational knowledge transfer and sharing
flow map
the knowledge, it will have more complex and higher
value knowledge [16], and will greatly increase the
output. However, the knowledge owner does not always
have the will to share the knowledge , such as the
individuals refuse to transfer and share knowledge with
others in order to maintain the expert influence power,
and could not have a reasonable reward during the
knowledge sharing.
In the organization, the information is asymmetrical,
and the output is the result of joint efforts of all the
employees. So the research of knowledge transfer and
sharing is usually based on the following basic
assumptions:
First of all, the economic man hypothesis. The
employees are all the rational egocentrics, and they all
have a very good definition of preferences. In the face of
a given condition, they will maximize their own
preferences.
Secondly, the employees have greater autonomy in the
process of knowledge transfer and sharing. They can
choose the best knowledge independently to achieve a
certain output.
Third, there is information asymmetry between the
knowledge employees and the organization. The employees
are at a comparative advantage in the information, and it
is incomplete information game between the employees
and the organization.
Transferring and sharing knowledge can improve
productivity and competitiveness in the organization. But
the employees contribute their knowledge will reduce the
economic interest, reputation and status due to the
monopoly of knowledge. Therefore, the employees often
hope to share other people's knowledge and not to
contribute their knowledge.
In addition to meet the three basic assumptions above,
the paper also subject to the following economic
assumption:
1) Assuming that the employees are risk-neutral in the
organization.

230 Lingling Zhang, Xiuyu Zheng, Jun Li, Guangli Nie, Guoqing Huo & Yong Shi
JSSM
2) The output is not subject to external uncertainty
factors, and is the function of the level of all the
employees’ knowledge transfer and sharing.
5. Research of the Incentive Mechanism in
the Knowledge Transfer and Sharing
Based on the Knowledge Potential
The incentive contract of knowledge transfer and sharing
in the organization is under the asymmetric information.
Assuming that the clients cannot observe the action
choice of the agents which is the shared knowledge
volume
k
and external variable
k
, only can observe the
output
π
. At this time, the agent’s incentive compatibility
constraint is contributing, because regardless of how the
clients reward and punish the agents, the agents always
choose the action maximizing their own utility level. In
other words, the clients cannot use “mandatory contract”
to force the agents to choose the clients’ favourite action,
but only through the incentive contract to induce the
agents to choose the clients’ favourite action. The clients’
problem is to choose incentive contract which meets the
agents’ participation constraint and incentive
compatibility constraint simultaneously to maximize their
own expected utility functions.
Assuming that the minimum possible value of the
shared knowledge volume is
L
k
, the maximum possible
value is
H
k
, and the minimum possible value of the
organizational output produced by the knowledge transfer
and sharing is
min
π
, the maximum possible value is
max
π
.
If the agents actively share knowledge,
H
k k
= ，
distributing function and distributing density of
π
is
respectively
( )
H
F
π
and
( )
H
f
π
; if the agents do not
actively share knowledge,
L
k k
=
, and distributing
density of
π
is respectively
( )
L
F
π
and
( )
L
f
π
.
Supposed to regard the output
π
of knowledge transfer
and sharing to the organization as a random variable,
( ,)
k
π θ
changes along with
k
in the same direction.
That is to say the more knowledge quantity the agents
share, the higher outputs are produced. Distributing
function satisfies the first-order stochastic dominance
condition, i.e. with all
min max
[ ,]
π ππ ∈ ,
( )( )
H L
F F
π π
≤
and strict inequality comes into existence at least to
some
π
. In other words, compared to not actively sharing
knowledge, the actively sharing knowledge has the
higher probability of producing higher output.
Further assuming
()( )
H L
C kCk
> which means the
cost of actively sharing knowledge is higher than the one
of not actively sharing, and the clients wish the agents
choose
H
k k
= . At this time the agents’ incentive
compatibility constraint means
/ 0
W π
∂∂ ≠
. To enable
the agents consciously have sufficient enthusiasm for
choosing to share knowledge, the clients must abandon
Pareto optimal risk-sharing contracts. The clients’
problems are to choose incentive contract
( )
W
π
to
resolve the following optimization problem:
max(( ))( )
H
v Wfd
πππ π
−
∫
(1)
s.t. ()(())( )()
H
IRu WfdCHu
ππ π
− ≥
∫
(2)
()(( ))( )()
(( ))()()
H
L
ICu WfdCH
u WfdCL
πππ
ππ π
− ≥
−
∫
∫
(3)
u
is the agents’ reservation utility. The most important
result of principle-agent model is that it can predict what
kind of observational variables should enter incentive
contract. So in the design of incentive mechanism the key
is to bring the organizational output
π
produced by the
knowledge transfer and sharing to the incentive contract.
This is because
π
is the function of the shared
knowledge volume
k
, we can indirectly observe
k
through observing the value of
π
.
We can imagine that, if the promise the organizations
make to encourage the high-potential knowledge
employees for knowledge sharing and the commitment is
believed. Let incentive cost
( )
W W
π
= , i.e. the incentive
cost
W
which the organization pays to the high-
potential knowledge employees is the function of the
organizational output
π
produced by knowledge
sharing. To be simple, consider two extreme cases, if the
employees do not transfer knowledge, then
0
k
=
,
( )0
k π
=
,
(( ))0
W k π
=
. If the employees transfer
knowledge, then
(( ))
W Wk
π = and deem
π
increases
along with
k
increases,
W
increases along with
π
increases. Put these values to the game matrix of the
employees and the organization in table1, and then we
get the improved game matrix as shown in Table 3:
From the above improved game matrix we can see that
when the organization is committed to encourage and the
incentive cost
(( ))
W Wk
π = , the best choice of the
high-potential knowledge employees is knowledge
sharing. In this way, the organization can monitor the
high-potential knowledge employees’ knowledge sharing
without any actions.
The above incentive mechanism is designed to the
high-potential knowledge employees, and the incentive
mechanism for the high-potential knowledge employees
should satisfy the following constraints. Firstly, the
Table 3. The improved game matrix
Employees
Organization Transfer Not Transfer
Encourage
(( )(( )),
(( ))())
k Wk
WkCk
π π
π
−
−
(0,0)
Not Encourage
(( ),( ))
kCk
π
−
(0,0)

A Way to Improve Knowledge Sharing: from the Perspective of Knowledge Potential 231
JSSM
high-potential knowledge employees should undertake
some organizational operational risk, so they have
indirectly the future profit view to the organization;
Secondly, the rewards of the high-potential knowledge
employees should be changed along with the organizational
profits; thirdly, when the organization evaluate the knowledge
sharing performances of the high-potential knowledge
employees, it should add some exogenous variables
which can be observed.
6. The Incentive Mechanism Application to
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the Organization
Knowledge Transfer and Sharing
The specific encouragement can adopt equity incentive.
As a consequence of the character of equity incentive, it
very well suites to the required condition of the high-
potential knowledge employees’ encouragement. Taking
equity incentive to the high-potential knowledge
employees makes them undertake some organizational
operational risk, so they can put their own profits closely
with the organizational profits. It introduces repeated
games virtually, In repeated games the players will
consider that their current actions will influence other
players’ future actions, i.e. consider the current profits as
well as the future profits. So the knowledge sharing is
possible in repeated games. And the rewards of the high-
potential knowledge employees will be changed along
with the organizational profits. When the organizational
profits increase, their profits will increase correspondingly.
It makes there are exogenous variables which can be
observed in the evaluating of the high - potential
knowledge employees’ knowledge sharing.
From the above game of knowledge sharing we know
there does trust game exist. When the generated synergy
value is higher than its negative effects, there are two
equilibriums, i.e. (sharing, sharing) and (non-sharing,
non-sharing). At this point, the player adopts a
wait-and-see attitude. If the other player chooses sharing,
then sharing. If the other player chooses non-sharing,
then the most optimum choice is non-sharing. As by
improving their own knowledge through the knowledge
sharing process, the low-potential knowledge employees
can get more proceeds than the costs of learning they pay,
and the organizations’ adopting equity incentive to the
high-potential knowledge employees makes their optimal
choices are knowledge sharing, so the low-potential
knowledge employees’ optimal choices are knowledge
sharing. The more proceeds of the low-potential
knowledge employees’ learning knowledge, the stronger
learning motivation will be.
The organization can adopt appropriate bonus incentive
to the low-potential knowledge employees to make sure
they could not only enhance their own value when
actively participating in knowledge sharing, but also
enjoy the utility of economic incentive. The organization
can take equity incentive after the low-potential
knowledge employees’ knowledge values arise to the
high potential. In this way organization cannot only save
the incentive costs of organizational knowledge transfer
and sharing, but also can reduce the unfairness sense
among the employees who have different knowledge
potential in the process of knowledge transfer and
sharing.
7. Conclusions
In virtue of the complementary knowledge, the
knowledge transfer and sharing is beneficial to every
employee, but the knowledge game between the
organization and the employees as well as between the
employees are still trapped in prisoner’s dilemma. By
encouraging the high-potential knowledge employees
to transfer and share their core knowledge voluntarily
to drive the low-potential knowledge employees to
participate in knowledge sharing to obtain their own
additional utility we can make the employees and
organization achieve a win-win situation. Knowledge
sharing incentive should be a step-by-step process.
Excessive incentive will enhance the organizational
costs and create unsatisfied sense. Little incentive
cannot inspire the employees’ enthusiasm. Analyzing
the game process of knowledge transfer and sharing can
find that the application of principle-agent into
infinitely repeated game, increasing the employees’
expected utility of knowledge transfer and sharing,
avoiding the employees’ short-term actions and
strengthening the consistent interests between the
organization and the employees will play a positive role
to promote the knowledge transfer and sharing.
As the knowledge measurement is extremely difficult,
the paper measures the sharing knowledge through the
output, and proposes an equity incentive mechanism to
the knowledge transfer and sharing in the organization,
but do not have a deep exploration to the mode of
equity incentive. Further research includes the
empirical test of analysis of this paper and making the
variables of influencing knowledge transfer and sharing
endogenous.
8. Acknowledgements
The original form of this paper has been appeared at the
Journal Publication Meeting (2007), September 24, 2007,
Toronto, Canada. This research has been partially
supported by a grant from National Natural Science
Foundation of China (#70501030, #70621001) and
Beijing Natural Science Foundation (#9073020).
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