Contemporary Adolescent Masculinities and the Challenge of Hegemonic Masculinity ()
1. Introduction
Contemporary adolescence is recognized as a particularly important moment in the construction of different masculinities. In this article, we consider the following questions: is it possible to identify different ideal types of present-day masculinities? What are they and how do they relate to each other? What vision of the feminine and of equality between sexes and sexualities do they convey? In order to answer these questions, we apply a psycho-sociological approach that enables us to overcome problems common to strictly psychological and sociological analyses. This allows us to pay particular attention to how individual conceptions, attitudes and behaviors can be influenced by the groups, the cultural backgrounds and spheres to which an individual belongs.
1.1. Adolescent Masculinities as an Object of Study
Masculinity is a dynamic concept that has evolved significantly over time, as has the notion of adolescence, especially since the beginning of the twentieth century. The 1970s saw the emergence of “youth culture”1, which not only distinguished adolescence from other age groups, but also divided itself into youth subcultures based on race, ethnicity, economic status, public appearance, or a variety of other factors (Hughes & Short, 2015). The reshaping of masculinity among the younger generations is now the subject of growing interest, albeit not one without controversy2. It is in this historical context that our typological research into models of adolescent masculinity in the European region of Wallonia (Belgium) has been carried out? Rogers, Nielson and Santos (2021) have recently authored a review of the literature on adolescent masculinities and have highlighted the relevance of a developmental and contextual approach to masculinities. While interpersonal relationships play a crucial role in the construction of masculinities through the process of socialization, masculinities cannot be isolated from broader socio-cultural systems. Adolescents do not live in a vacuum; they grow up in a particular time and place. As stated in the public significance statement of Rogers, Nielson, and Santos’ article, “research in the past two decades evidences the relevance of masculine gender-role socialization during adolescence. Many youth devote significant energy to navigating male-role norms in their relationships and social environments. Their accommodation of masculine norms has identifiable implications for development in regards to health, relationships, and academics”.
In fact, it appears that we are confronted with evolutions in masculinities consisting of accommodations and contradictions.
Gender equity and equality have been widely promoted in our societies over the past decades. While general support for gender equality, including among the male population, is increasing, this support often appears conditional with respect to young men (Off, Charron, & Alexander, 2022). Numerous studies in English, French, and Spanish affirm that contemporary forms of adolescent masculinity are accompanied by a reinforcement of gender-based divisions in many countries (Burn-Murdoch, 2024; Campbell, May, Duffy, Skinner, Gottfried, & Hewlett, 2024; Sanmartín Ortí, Kuric Kardelis, & Gómez Miguel, 2022) and the persistent maintenance of a hegemonic identity model (Galland, 2010; Dabrowski, 2018). This model is notably characterized by toughness; detachment from schoolwork (Ayral, 2011); sporting prowess (Phoenix, 2004); financial ambition; and competition between peers (Neff, Cooper, & Woodruff, 2007).
These findings prompted us to design a research project with a focus on identifying models of masculinity in adolescence rather than highlighting general trends. The approach is thus inductive and does not require the a priori formulation and verification of precise assumptions.
The definition of masculinity used in this study refers to the sociological concept of gender. Masculinity is not seen as a natural, biological attribute, but rather as a multidimensional concept molded by everyday social practices and interactions that are subject to significant social and cultural pressures, and which materialize in opinions, representations and attitudes (West & Zimmerman, 2009)3.
Masculinities as Configurations of Practices
The sociologist Connell (2005b) has stressed the importance of adolescence in the construction of masculinities as it is a particular period when models of masculinity are either appropriated and embodied, or negotiated and, on occasion, rejected, and that this is no small way due to interactions between peers.4 However, Connell has warned against the temptation to think of adolescence exclusively in terms of the individual without considering existing power relations, notably in the domain of sexuality.5 An early advocate of feminist epistemology,6 Connell’s thinking is informed by critical feminist and Gramscian theories, which are clearly reflected in two of her theoretical assertions: a) masculinity is relational, plural, and dynamic; and b) masculinity is conceived as “configurations of practices” shaped by complex, concrete social relations (of power, production and affect) situated in time and space.
Although the theoretical approach Connell adopts in Masculinities in 2005 is not the only one,7 it is an essential milestone in the emergence and constitution of the field of masculinity studies, especially where the societal context is concerned, and remains a reference for a new generation of researchers (Bridges & Pascoe, 2016). This approach, therefore, appeared to be the most relevant foundation for our research work, especially given that the way identity construction of “being a man” is often conceived remains overly essentialized and thought of as homogenous, particularly in psychology.
1.2. Which Configurations of Practice Emerge from Typological
Studies of Masculinities?
Based on empirical research (life stories or observations of adults in this case), Connell’s (2005a) work highlights the diversity of masculinities from which emerge four ideal types of configurations of practice, including a central model. These ideal types8 account for both the relationships men maintain between each (how they distance themselves or not from a so-called hegemonic model of masculinity) as well as those they maintain with women (how men and women experience power relationships and the effects of these on their bodily, material, relational, and symbolic experiences).
The first ideal type, hegemonic masculinity, echoes the observations of Sharon Bird (1996) and refers to a display of attitudes, opinions and behaviors characterized by emotional detachment, competition, and objectification, particularly the sexual objectification of women. It has played a role in perpetuating the notion that men’s domination over women and other men is the “standard” of masculinity. Unlike hegemonic masculinity, the model of complicit masculinity does not openly claim the primacy of the masculine over the feminine but does nothing to deconstruct it either. It confers the privilege of being male without taking a public stance on male supremacy. The last two models of masculinity—subordinate and marginalized—convey the marked social ascendancy that one group of dominant men exerts over the others. On the one hand, the subordinate model falls within the realm of subordination as it does not conform to the emotional, competitive, and sexual power practices expected of “real men”. On the other hand, marginalized masculinity is associated with social and material failure and/or belonging to a racial minority.
Is this typology still relevant today given that there is increasing talk of men, and society more generally, having taken up the feminist cause?
1.3. Hegemonic Masculinity as a Process in the Making
Due to its centrality and vague nature, the concept of hegemonic masculinity (which could be considered a “rascal concept”9) has been critically refined and revised, notably by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) and Messerschmidt (2012, 2016). In 2019, Messerschmidt (2019) still maintained that Connell’s original emphasis on the legitimation of unequal gender relations remained essential to both the concept and the field of critical masculinity studies.
For her part, the African American sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2009) called for power relations to be viewed from a dialectical perspective as domination also provokes redefinitions and resistances. Her work has been echoed by the Portuguese sociologist Sofia Aboim (2016): Although multiple, the journeys of trans-masculine individuals demonstrate how bodily experiences shape and redefine masculinities in ways that illuminate the nexus between bodies, embodiments, and discursive enactments of masculinity (Aboim & Vasconcelos, 2021: p. 43). Aboim has called for a distinction to be drawn between the notions of domination and hegemony: hegemony as the “historical snapshot” of what in a given moment—to a greater or lesser extent—lies at the core of the ideological field upholding the power of men, and domination, as a social process stemming from the practice of all men, in all material positions and cultural frameworks’ (Aboim, 2016: p. 38). The model of hegemonic masculinity thus appears here as the result of a historical context and a process in the making, a process which involves appropriation, negotiation, and translation, as well as reconfiguration and hybridization.
Thus, while Raewyn Connell (2005a) has identified the significant role played by homophobia in the hegemonic masculinity model, this model can appropriate traits from other models of masculinity it has previously denigrated. Anderson (2016) considers that sexual attraction relationships are becoming increasingly accepted and Bridges and Pascoe (2016) have confirmed that there is a phenomenon where young adolescents appropriate certain elements of the same sex culture. However, they emphasize that this process of cultural appropriation does not necessarily lead to greater gender or sexual equality, concurring with Vörös’s (2020: p. 20) claim that “any practice of masculinity implies above all a certain degree of complicity with the patriarchal order”, as well as Demetrakis Demetriou (2001: p. 355), who has stated that “it is precisely through its hybrid and apparently contradictory content that hegemonic masculinity reproduces itself”.
According to Aboim (2016), the more general transformative effect of the new value accorded to intimacy, as well as women’s agency, means that are now three observable models of family functioning associated with specific and hierarchical ways of asserting oneself as a “man”:
a) an unequal sharing model governed by the norm of the male provider and protector, defending his autonomy and primacy;
b) an unequal sharing model with a man who is neither provider nor caregiver, even if he expresses a desire to be involved in the private sphere;
c) a dual provider/caregiver model based on the principle of companionship and where the objective of achieving gender equality is asserted.
This third model instinctively speaks to us as it is identifiable in our social and cultural environment and from observations we have made in previous studies.10
1.4. From Gender Order to Gender Regime
In 1995, Raewyn Connell insisted that hegemonic power was transversal to the gender order that justifies and structures hierarchical relations at the societal level, as well as the gender regime that concretely structures power and disciplinary mechanisms (Hill Collins, 2009). The work of black feminists has been particularly valuable as it has encouraged us to pay particular attention to the interplay between social relations of sex (which we define as “gender” following Laure Bereni et al., 2020) and the intertwining of political economy and politics in an increasingly globalized context.
Recently, the anthropologists Cornwall, Karioris and Lindisfarne (2016) have re-emphasized the need to articulate the gender order from a political economy perspective. This is due to the fact that the era of neoliberal hegemony a) naturalizes inequality by framing it as genetic and as a matter of individual responsibility; b) increases gender marking linked to the commodification of social relations; and c) expands the physical and cultural distance between elites and ordinary people. Numerous studies have highlighted the persistence of links between gender and political and coercive mechanisms (Wacquant, 2012; Mohr, 2019) that are put in place to regulate gender relations in particular institutions (Aboim, 2016). For instance, schools continue to enforce a gendered division of labor (Connell, 2005b) and participate in the dissemination of messages that contrast girls with boys (Smith, 2007). For their part, families and peer groups undeniably continue to play an important role in the transmission of gendered practices and subliminal messages (Gavray & Boulard, 2021). Such messages include the happiness injunction described by the psychiatrist Edgard Cabanas and the sociologist Eva Illouz (2018) as spearheading the neoliberal political economy’s cultural revolution. They evoke a mode of governmentality in which happiness and its industry have invaded all the interstices of society, including citizenship and new management styles, as well as our individual obsessions, particularly where sexuality is concerned. In both real and virtual spaces, sexual stereotypes that disadvantage girls and women are still legion. Whether sexist beliefs, opinions, and practices are benevolent or hostile (Glick & Fiske, 1996), they serve to reaffirm relations of domination and (re)position each sex “in its place” in the gender order.11 Dabrowski (2018) points to the emergence of a generation of “man-children” as characteristic of early masculine culture where anything goes, which is notably reflected in casual and libertarian sexual encounters. The existence of a sexual double standard in relationships of the same sexual attraction highlighted by studies in social psychology refers to the idea that men are more sexually demanding than girls and have less control over their sexual desires, making girls custodians of normative sexuality (Kaltiala-Heino et al., 2018) and responsible when things go wrong.12 At the same time, increasingly younger teenage girls are encouraged to use their “sexual freedom” to achieve pleasure, often without realising that they are expected to become desirable, consenting the same sexual attraction’s subjects. Most girls who have engaged in sexting say they do so under pressure, as opposed to only a handful of boys. For their part, boys are required to present a tough, the same sexual attraction masculinity for their peers through certain types of performances, as well as through technological affordances, including “the ‘phallic’ collecting, posting, tagging, and rating of girls’ and women’s digital bodies” (Naezer & Ringrosse, 2018: p. 416). Boys tell each other about their first encounters with “pornos” in order to show off to their peers, while girls see this material as useful for informing themselves and debating with friends (Amsellem-Mainguy & Vuattoux, 2020). Thus, sexuality appears to remain at the heart of competition between male adolescents.
Alison Phipps and Isabel Young (2014) have demonstrated how competitive and commercial individualism, which is based on the image of a rational and entrepreneurial social subject, undeniably influences the way we think about and construct ourselves from an early age. The Portuguese philosopher and journalist Maçaes (2022, online) points out that “the new political economy reaches deep inside your soul. The darkest side of the knowledge economy is that it has gradually destroyed the separation between intellectual and material life”, and moreover, “social media offers no respite from social pressure. It reinforces and intensifies the need to conform well-adjusted”. For Evans (2024) the ideological polarization of the sexes is also sustained, more often unconsciously than not, by gendered cultural bubbles, including communities of opinion created by social media networks and nurtured by misogynistic influencers, as well as by the economic resentment young men feel in response to the widening scope of women’s cultural production. Gefjon Off (2023) and Gefjon Off, Nicholas Charron, Amy Alexander (2022) have made a similar observation having found that young men living in regions where unemployment was rising and confidence in public institutions was low were particularly likely to be opposed to women’s rights. This has led some researchers to argue that gender equality cannot be promoted without supporting men’s emotional flexibility (Croft, Atkinson, & May, 2021). But would such an approach be sufficient?
These factors forcefully underscore the fact that collective and individual contexts are closely intertwined, as are material and psycho-social manifestations. They must be considered in conjunction and at the intersection of gender and class relations (Naezer, 2020; Clair, 2023). It is for this reason it was important to pay attention to all these elements in our research.
2. Methodology: Putting Adolescent Masculinities to the Test
2.1. Selecting a Research Methodology
Our typological approach employs a quantitative methodology. The aim of this exploratory work has been to test statistical processing models that are often theoretical or based on qualitative methodologies and which rarely focus on young people (Dabrowski, 2018). It should be noted that we have regularly coordinated research using both types of methods (often combined) on adolescents, including, for example, our contribution to the International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD). The 2017 data analysed here represent the second wave of an earlier survey carried out in 2006 with a similar sample and based on a relatively similar questionnaire. This survey revealed similarities between Belgium and Canada in terms of teenagers’ gender stereotypes and the issues they faced at school (Gavray & Adriaenssens, 2010). It is beyond the scope of this article to compare responses and trends between the two waves, but it should be noted that we observed a significant stability in trends. Similarities can also be identified in the case of France (if we consider, for example, the various annual reports on the state of sexism in France), despite the fact that comparisons between surveys remain extremely difficult, given the variability of age groups and questions asked.
The data for our survey were collected in 2017 from secondary schools in the Arrondissement of Liège (Belgium), using a sample that was as representative as possible. The first step was to contact all the secondary schools in the area after which we randomly selected a number of third-year classes from the overall list of such classes present in the schools that had agreed to take part in the survey. We compared the composition of the selection with the official figures, bearing in mind that some third-year technical and vocational classes are mainly composed of boys or girls. In each class selected, all the pupils, i.e. boys and girls, took part in the survey, with only a handful of exceptions due to the fact that the survey was carried out at school and did not require the prior written parental consent. In the end, 14 questionnaires had to be excluded because they were unreliable. Taking the official data available at the individual level into account, we adjusted—by random selection—the number of questionnaires retained to ensure cross-representation between gender group and type of education so as to obtain the best final distribution. In this article, we analyze data from 324 male students (48% of the total sample) surveyed in the third year of general, technical or vocational secondary education (representing 58%, 23% and 19% of the total respectively). The average age of respondents was approximately 15. Further details regarding the sample can be found in Appendix 1. Note that no teacher was present when the questionnaire was administered, but two young researchers were on hand to observe and provide assistance.
The questionnaire was quite close to the Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory (CMNI) created by Mahalik et al. (2003), which comprises 94 items and includes 11 distinct factors. Our questionnaire first collected data on young people’s profiles and their involvement in various spheres (school, citizenship, family, friendship, intimacy and leisure). The main section of the questionnaire focused on participants’ opinions concerning each sex group, as well as their attitudes and behaviors “as a boy” or “future man”. It included 90 statements which participants were asked to position themselves in relation by choosing one of four responses: strongly disagree/slightly disagree/slightly agree/strongly agree. The aim here was to measure the degree of proximity to significant elements of the masculine construct at this developmental stage and in conjunction with contemporary issues surrounding conceptions and concrete behaviors of separation and hierarchization between the sexes emphasized, in particular, by Thiers-Vidal (2010). Three main dimensions were investigated. The first concerned asymmetry and the difference in symbolic and material value between men and women, between what is considered masculine and feminine. The second dimension relates to the values and attitudes of attraction to material domination. The third dimension focused on sexuality, which, if it is as important to the self-definition of identity as Anthony Giddens (1993) asserted ahead of his time, continues to constitute a central axis of power relations between men and between sex groups as discussed in the theoretical section above (Vuattoux, 2013).
2.2. Compiling Factors Prior to Typological Analysis and Assigning them to Subjects
Typology is a methodical approach to defining or studying a set of types in order to facilitate the analysis, classification and study of complex realities. At the end of the research process, it is expected that a statistical investigation by cluster will reveal different “typical” ways of reasoning and functioning, with each survey subject being closely associated with one type, without necessarily adopting all its traits. Such an investigation can also provide us with an idea of the relative importance of each category of subject classification, enabling us to discuss their scope and implications.
The typological analysis carried out for this study is based on how participants positioned themselves in relation to a set of social representations and attitudes investigated via the survey questionnaire. Statistically, this positioning has been “condensed” into the personal scores obtained for various factors, which we have then tested and considered conjointly to see whether these factors can serve to differentiate between certain groups of individuals and to update different models. To begin with, the items related to the three “thematic” dimensions outlined above underwent a factor analysis (principal component analysis, Varimax method in SAS).13 For each of these dimensions, the analysis identified distinct factors and the solution of two factors seemed the best one (with good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .80 and .85 for each of the six factors retained). You find the composition of each factor in Appendix 2.
Concerning the initial “asymmetry” dimension, a distinction emerged between what belongs to the private and public spheres. In the private sphere, the factor we call “Asym 1” reflects the level of adherence to the nuclear family model and the complementarity of roles, valorizing men’s roles as breadwinners and protectors of women. As for the factor we call “Asym 2”, it reflects the level of adherence to the idea of men’s primacy in the public sphere, in politics and in employment.
The “power” dimension also divided into two distinct factors. The first factor (which we call “Power 1”) reflects the level of proximity to attitudes of impulsivity and physical domination; the second factor (called “Power 2”) accounts for the greater or lesser acceptance of norms associated with male domination and the notion that these norms are natural.
The last dimension, centered on sexuality, is split into two factors as well. The first (Sexual 1) relates to the imperative of the same sexual attraction and the sexual surveillance of girls and women. The second factor (Sexual 2) relates to the normalization of sexual predation, as well as to the liberalization and commodification of sexuality.
In the following step, we assigned a score to each young person for each of the six factors. In order to do this, we added up the different scores obtained for each item in the factor, taking into account the relative weighting each score represents in the composition of the factor.
3. Results
3.1. Typological Analysis Results
A cluster analysis was carried out using SAS (Statistical Analysis System, version 9.4, FASTCLUS procedure14). The three-cluster solution proved the most informative. Three adolescent profiles or, more precisely, types of adolescence emerged as each adolescent found themselves associated with the cluster to which he was closest in terms of his positioning in relation to each of the 6 factors, without necessarily sharing all the associated characteristics (see Table 1).
Table 1. Average participant scores on each separate factor by cluster.
Main results of the cluster analysis |
|
N total =316 |
R-Square (for each factor) |
Cluster 1 |
Cluster 2 |
Cluster3 |
N = 40 (13%) RMS STd Dev = 2.47 Nearest cluster: 3 |
N = 137 (43%) RMS STd Dev = 1.98 Nearest cluster: 3 |
N = 139 (44%) RMS STd Dev = 2.16 Nearest cluster: 2 |
Asym 1 |
0.2169 |
11.099 |
9.648 |
8.853 |
R-Square 0.20 |
Std Dev 1.83 |
Std Dev 1.71 |
St Dev 1.50 |
Asym 2 |
0.4767 |
12.902 |
15.121 |
10.047 |
R-Square 0.48 |
Std Dev 3.60 |
Std Dev 2.10 |
Std Dev 2.44 |
Power 1 |
0.7242 |
32.403 |
23.874 |
19.157 |
R-Square 0.72 |
Std Dev 3.05 |
Std Dev 2.40 |
Std Dev 2.66 |
Power 2 |
0.2892 |
17.214 |
15.707 |
13.036 |
R-Square 0.38 |
Sd Dev 2.24 |
Std Dev 2.54 |
Std Dev 2.57 |
Sexual 1 |
0.1609 |
7.425 |
6.868 |
6.016 |
R-Square 0.13 |
Std Dev 1.52 |
Std Dev 1.54 |
Std Dev 1.25 |
Sexual 2 |
0.3105 |
7.903 |
8.13248163 |
5.723 |
R-Square 0.44 |
Std Dev 1.93 |
St Dev 1.25 |
Std Dev 2.12 |
OVER-ALL |
0.4976 |
|
Pseudo f statistic = 156.96, Cubic Clustering criterion = 3.660.
As can be seen from the table above, 40 subjects found themselves associated with Cluster 1, 137 subjects with Cluster 2 and an almost equivalent number—139 subjects—with Cluster 315. We are aware that we must be careful when interpreting results from Cluster 1 given that it is only made up of a small number of subjects.
The results appear acceptable given that the total R-squared value close to 0.50 reflects the human domain, as well as the fact that the R-squared values of the different factors are not low either. The highest values can be seen in the factors “Power 1”, followed by “Asym 2” and then “Sexual 2”, which represent respectively the “most intense” factor of gendered hierarchization for each initial thematic dimension.
Comparing the average scores of the 6 factors between clusters, we can see from the table above that Cluster 1 has the highest scores across all factors, except for Asym 2 (primacy of men in the public sphere and in employment) and Sexual 2 (defense of an aggressive, market-driven sexuality). These two scores are the highest in Cluster 2, while the other scores in this cluster are in an intermediate position in comparison with the other clusters. Finally, Cluster 3 has the lowest scores across all factors. It should be noted that we were able to check that the difference between clusters was significant in terms of the score obtained on each factor (p < 0.001 obtained in each case after a GLM regression procedure using SAS). It is clear that none of the clusters can be considered as totally disconnected from the others.
Let’s take a closer look at the position adopted within each cluster in terms of prevailing opinions and attitudes. In the case of Cluster 1 (in the minority), it is characterized by an attachment to the naturalist argument, which defends the nuclear family model and the “male breadwinner”. Two-thirds of young people in this cluster are certain that they would become fathers in the future (compared with one in two in the other clusters). Half of the subjects feel that their fathers expected them to be “traditionally” male (as opposed to 30% of subjects in Cluster 2% and 18% in Cluster 3)16. This group also demonstrates the clearest tendency to want to masculinize their bodies to make themselves physically imposing.
In the table, we can see that the other two clusters/models deviate from the first and this is in spite of clear differences in positioning between them.
Competition and rivalry between male peers are most highly valued in Cluster 2, as opposed to solidarity and concern for others (only 32% of subjects considered this an important issue compared to twice as many in Clusters 1 and 3). Whether young people in this cluster think of their future in terms of becoming self-made men, or see themselves as “heirs” to a successful bloodline, they support a specific gendered hierarchy of tasks and responsibilities and they largely take for granted the current hierarchy which largely dictates which positions men and women occupy in public and professional spheres (this is the case for 74% of respondents in Cluster 2, compared to only 44% in Cluster 1 and 35% in Cluster 3). It is also worthwhile noting that just 19% respondents in this cluster believe that the issue of gender inequality remains relevant in our society (as opposed to 42% in Cluster 1 and 56% in Cluster 3). If they attribute the same sexual freedoms to both sex groups, there is an affinity for “porn chic” and a pronounced rejection of male sexual attraction. 41% of young people in this cluster completely reject this form of the sexual attraction, compared with 21% in Cluster 1 and just 6% in Cluster 3.
As for Cluster 3, almost all the young people in this cluster claim to distance themselves from the norms of hegemonic sexuality. There is significantly less reluctance to adopt interests and attitudes that are more closely associated with the feminine. For example, subjects in this cluster appear to be much more attentive to their emotional needs and to their future quality of life and occupation of time. There is an overwhelming rejection of the utilitarian vision of women’s bodies (as reproduction or sexual satisfaction tools). The scores across all six factors were the lowest in this cluster reflecting a significant reassessment of stereotypical opinions and attitudes, as well as a more “egalitarian” outlook17 (78% in this cluster think without restriction that girls and boys have the same rights. This is the case for 43% in Cluster 1 and 34% in Cluster 2). However, this finding is not entirely consistent with the following result: subjects in Cluster 3 appear significantly to be the least aware of the fact that our society continues to favor men over women.
3.2. At the Intersection of Gender and Class Relations
Numerous studies have persistently shown the significant links between socio-cultural background on the one hand and upbringing and family culture and resources on the other (Coulangeon, 2004; Segalen & Martial, 2013). Intersectionality18 is more than just a reason to study “difference” for its own sake; rather, it evokes a systemic and multidimensional hierarchy for explaining why certain differences are expected to be socially significant (McCall, 2013: p. 4). In line with feminist studies, Raewyn Connell has approached conceptions of masculinity from a highly empirical angle, highlighting the intersections between social relations of gender as well as class. These are immediately apparent in the hierarchical relationships between the hegemonic and marginalized masculinities she describes.
In Western societies, the type of educational program in which a student is enrolled has become a key indicator of their social origins. As far as Belgium is concerned, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has repeatedly demonstrated that the current school systems remain highly inegalitarian and they push pupils towards secondary school “choices” (general, technical or vocational) (Hirtt, 2020). Successive studies have shown that these different programs are significantly connected with life conditions but also with young people’s values, attitudes and behavior (Depoilly, 2014; Gavray & Boulard, 2021).
The youths of cluster 1 are significantly more likely to be enrolled in secondary education programs that rapidly prepare them for a profession (vocational) and they also exhibit the strongest tendency to distance themselves from their professional futures. Our results show that this cluster contains the highest proportion of young people whose fathers were not employed at the time of the survey (33% versus nearly 18% in the other two groups). At the same time, 29% of pupils (three times as many as the other clusters) have the impression that neither their fathers nor their mothers or teachers support them or are interested in their lives. On the other hand, 47% of this group think that their fathers strongly require (score of 8 and + on a scale of 10) that they correspond to what is expected of a future man, versus 30% in Cluster 2 and 19% in Cluster 3. While objective social conditions are shown as important in explaining values, attitudes and behaviors, our previous research has also demonstrated the elevated significance of societal vulnerability (psycho-social experiences resulting from an accumulation of negative experiences within family and with societal institutions: school, youth care, etc. (Pauwels et al., 2011)).
Conversely, young people associated with Cluster 3 have considerably more cultural and social advantages. The proportion of respondents in this cluster with fathers who have obtained higher education qualifications (Master level) is particularly high (40%). It is also worthwhile noting that this cluster has the lowest proportion of subjects enrolled single-sex classes (16.7% as opposed to almost 30% in the other clusters). Young people in this cluster also have the highest level of school involvement and the greatest willingness to take part in school decision-making, even if they are not averse to criticizing their educational establishments. Furthermore, it is in this cluster that young people most often noted that both of their parents were involved in day-to-day organization (this is the case for 50% of subjects, versus 34% in Cluster 2 and 23% in Cluster 1) and that they personally attached the least importance to religion (11%, compared with more than twice as many in the other clusters).
The greatest academic and social diversity of respondents can be found in Cluster 2. They were the most critical of public institutions and harbored projects to obtain material success and dominant positions in the economic field, the latter serving as the key factor behind their investments.
3.3. Towards a Classification of the Clusters
Reflecting on the survey results in relation to the different types and labels of masculinities defined by Raewyn Connell, the model associated with Cluster 2 appears to be the one that most closely resembles her conception of hegemonic masculinity. “Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell, 2005a: p. 77). We see a clear emphasis on value and competitive strategies to acquire status and resources (including sexual resources) in the attitudes and opinions displayed in this model.19 A clear rejection of male-sexual attraction contrasts here with the fact that female-sexual attraction is only completely rejected by approximately 20% of the subjects20. This group affirms more a undifferentiation of uncontrollable sexual desires of girls and boys. These results are consistent with those first obtained in 2006 (Gavray & Adriaenssens, 2010): while boys believed that girls experience the same level of sexual desires and expectations as they do, girls perceived their own desires and expectations to be much lower than those of boys.21 This equalization of sexuality may only be a false pretense of equality in our postmodern societies according to Cabana & Illouz (2018).
The fact that respondents in Cluster 1 appear to be those who are most distant from professional and financial benefits as well as those who promote the perpetuation of a fixed family model in a society that values short term and mobility (Mathieu, 1991) suggests that this cluster could be associated with the marginalized masculinity model.
There is no contention possible where Cluster 3 is concerned; young people associated with it are the least attached to stereotypes and hierarchies in every respect and particularly in terms of gender as they clearly distance themselves from attributes of virility and imperatives of competition. We see similarities to the third model proposed by Aboim (2016), where gender equality is presented as self-evident. But we can also discern the emergence of an adherence to a “slow” lifestyle reinforced by a rejection of some demands (especially temporal) imposed by a neo-liberal political economy, as well as disenchantment with the culture of their elders, as has been highlighted by Paul Bouffartigue (1999). These distance taking are facilitated by the privileged social group to which they often belong. Nevertheless, there are contradictory views expressed within this group at adult age following Acherroy’s (2020: p. 7) observations: While the “new masculinities and paternities correspond to a view of family relationships that is more democratic and more ‘egalitarian’, they are still exercised on the basis of certain privileges that it would no doubt be timely to interrogate”. The fact that respondents demonstrated a high level of acceptance for the principle of gender equality while also harboring strong beliefs that formal and material equality between the sexes has already been achieved suggests that we should not fully apply the “egalitarian” label to this cluster. When interpreting the results, it is essential to be aware of the shifting economic contexts and worldviews. Honneth (2008) invites us to consider the influence of cultural domination which highlights lived experiences, decisions, successes and personal interests. The emphasis on well-being and personal development in all its forms in Cluster 3 may support the idea that there is some complicity within the dominant world view and economic system. This suggests a certain overlap between Cluster 3 and 2.
4. Limitations
We are aware of the exploratory nature of our analyses. It would have been interesting to reproduce the typological analysis across two survey years in order to speak of evolution with greater assurance concerning the population studied, but this was not possible as the questionnaires used were not exactly identical. It would also be great if we had the possibility of following survey respondents over time and creating a real longitudinal database. Comparisons between countries and different interview languages are even more complicated and it remains essential to interpret the results with caution.
We cannot rule out the phenomenon of social/societal desirability, but it is not clear who a young person would aim to please: the interviewer or their friends, who are also taking part in the survey. When asked to what extent they thought their friends would like them to resemble what is traditionally expected of a boy, almost half the respondents answered more than 7 on a scale of 10. Both Enzmann et al. (2010) and Torrington et al. (2024) have demonstrated the validity of self-evaluations in an educational context when used with certain precautions (such as the absence of teachers or educators when a questionnaire is administered, the independence of teachers in their methodology and contact with the group, and the interference of parents in the decision to participate). Of course, there are many known factors (educational programs, the specific culture of each school and its physical and sociological environment, etc.) that can influence what adolescents experience and say about themselves, their opinions, and behaviors. However, our article did not focus on these elements. Finally, it would have been ideal to conduct individual and group meetings with teenagers to discover how qualitative data based on adolescents’ stories might challenge the interpretation of results from the quantitative survey.
5. Conclusion
The use of exploratory results to identify models and ideal types as defined by Marx Weber confirms, as do Ravn and Roberts (2021), a situation in which adolescents still find it difficult to distance themselves completely from the hegemonic masculinity despite increasing support for the principle of equality between sex groups (with regard to rights, intelligence).
The model that emerges from Cluster 1 clearly does not have a monopoly on continuing to endorse asymmetry between sex groups. In the model embodied by Cluster 2, the pursuit of status and financial dominance in public and private spheres is significantly associated with the minoritization of girls and women. In addition, our results show that the assertions of competitive and unfettered sexuality play a central role alongside professional aspirations in building this type of masculinity (Clair, 2013). It is certain that Cluster 3, which is as large as Group 2 (44% of respondents are related to it), reflects a model of masculinity farthest from stereotyped representations and attitudes and the most favorable to gender equality, but without necessarily espousing or assuming a political position that could be described as “feminist”22, and this in spite of the fact that 62% of young people in this group say they are interested or very interested in politics, compared with 33% in Cluster 1 and 39% in Cluster 2. Ultimately, our results confirm that male domination is in fact a dimension of class domination, with both relations of domination being “intertwined” (Oeser, 2022). As Connell (2005b) has argued, adolescence is an important period of life in today’s world. There is a wide variety of social spaces and actors that contribute to how existing models of masculinity (and femininity) are appropriated, lived, negotiated, and even interrogated. Being aware that a pole cannot be studied independently of the pole which is presented as opposite or complementary23, it would be useful to study the models of femininity in comparison and in relation to the models of masculinity highlighted in this study; to observe the evolution of the potential similarities with the male models in transformation. Demetriou (2001) has argued that masculinities must be thought of in dynamic terms, hybridizing24 and reconfiguring different models of masculinity that came before. This process of hybridization and reconfiguration takes place at a specific moment in time in a simultaneously globalized and conflictual world. Regardless of the broad diversity of individual positions in terms of opinions and attitudes, it would appear that the three models identified ultimately share, to varying degrees and in specific forms, the same basis: an embrace of certain neoliberal prescriptions. In the case of Cluster 1, this is to counter the risk of social downgrading; for Cluster 2, it manifests in an insistence on success; and, for Cluster 3, it can even be identified in the way a “slow” lifestyle is pursued. As Messerschmidt (2016) has speculated, the ceaseless and intricate entangling of structures and actions in reflexive activities can be accompanied by the persistence of gender distinctions and hierarchies, whether symbolic or material, and this despite repeated claims of neutrality (Falquet, 2014).
Therefore, according to experts including Rivoal (2018), Aho and Peltola (2023), despite the MeToo movement and a supposed critique of virility as old-fashioned by the ruling class, this does not mean hegemonic masculinity no longer exists and has ceased to influence power relations and elevate male-same sexual attraction above other forms of sexuality. A more inclusive form of masculinity does not automatically imply more equity and equality. This can be seen early on in young adults. The Rapport annuel 2024 sur l’état des lieux du sexisme en France (the Annual Report on the State of Sexism in France 2024) confirms that men, and especially young men, are increasingly adhering to masculinist stereotypes while women are under strong pressure to be feminine and give up more and more of their freedoms. The dynamic and historical approach underpinning this hypothesis raises several questions. For instance, how can we explore new forms of gendered and social subalternity25, particularly in virtual spaces? And how can we theoretically and practically comprehend ways of resisting them today, both collectively and locally in single-sex, mixed spaces (Barbaras & Devers, 2011; Govers, 2019). All this is unfolding in right and radical right declarations that deny racism, xenophobia and sexism (Fassin, 2024), which are themselves set against the backdrop of a wider discourse asserting hegemonic masculinity (Lamoureux & Dupuis-Déri, 2015). Among these discourses, warrior models of masculinity (Duncanson, 2021) are undergoing a revival while actors in the fourth wave of trans revolutionary feminism are calling for the deconstruction of the binary vision of gender and the supremacy of heteronormativity with which it is associated (Preciado, 2022).
Appendix 1
61% of the respondents live with both parents in the same household, 22% with their mother, almost 5% with their father, and 12% in some other situation. 82% of the young people surveyed were born in Belgium, and 85% of them speak French at home.
80% of fathers are employed, and 65% of mothers. 33% of mothers and 30% of fathers have higher education qualifications while 13.6% of mothers and 18% of fathers have less than a secondary education. 43% report that their family follows a particular religious tradition or belief and, in this case, 44% identify as Christian and 41% as Muslim.
Appendix 2
Composition of each sub-factor (result of factor analysis solution of two factors)
Asym 1
Q20. In my opinion, it is the mission of boys/men to protect girls/women
Q29. I take care to do what is expected of boys
Q42. For a man, success in life includes starting a family
Q81. It is up to boys to initiate date with girls
Q55. I often hide my emotions
Q42. For a man, success in life includes having children
Q43. For a man, success in life includes living as a couple
Q67. In my opinion, adventure stories are more interesting than love stories
Q91. It is normal to me that the man is the main breadwinner in the family
Q88i. It is not normal to me that men spend time taking care of children or involve themselves in family organization
Asym 2
Q24. In my opinion, boys are smarter than girls
Q45. I do not support anyone who believes that girls and boys are equal
Q74. In my opinion, it is normal that men are prioritized for senior positions
Q75i. I do not support women’s participation in political/economic decision-making
Q76. In my opinion, it is normal for men to earn more money than women
Q89. As a man, it is normal to put your family after your professional career
Q102inv. I do not think it is normal for women to walk in public spaces at their leisure
Q109. In my opinion, it is normal that some occupations are reserved for girls and others for boys
Power 1
Q19. Boys should be tough rather than sensitive
Q27. I prefer situations where I am the leader
Q41. In my opinion, it is normal for a boy to use force in conflict if necessary
Q44. You have to be a leader to find your place in school
Q53. I often feel in competition with others
Q58. I find it embarrassing to ask others for help
Q62. I feel drawn to firearms
Q68. I am attracted to violent movies and games
Q65d. I think everything would be boring without violence
Power2
Q35. I have been on a drinking binge in the last 30 days
Q48i. I do not like to let others decide
Q71. As a boy, I think it is normal to disobey parents and authorities
Q78. As a boy, I have a high resistance to physical pain
Q83. It is normal for boys to prepare for war
Q103c. I like to test myself by taking risks
Q103g. I sometimes lose my temper
Sexual 1
Q34. A boy does not express his sexual desires to a girl
Q69. Persons of the same sex are not really men
Q73. The female with same-sex attraction is not really women
Q85. It is more up to boys to decide when they want to have sex with girls than the inverse
Q82. Inv In my opinion, contraception is not the responsibility of men
Sexual 2
Q49. I think it is normal for men to have multiple sexual partners
Q66. I find it normal to pay someone to have sex with them
Q84. I think girls have uncontrollable sexual desires
Q92. I think it is normal for girls and a boy to watch websites and movies for adults
NOTES
1As with gender culture, youth culture should be understood as the values and models that young people adopt to shape their behavior.
2Particularly where the alarmist discourse about the “failure of boys” is concerned.
3French-speaking Belgium, where our research has been carried out, is geographically and culturally close to France, where this definition and approach remain significant and where we often find similar trends concerning gender stereotyped opinions and practices.
4Some twenty years later, French sociologist Clair (2023: p. 178), in a study of teenagers, reaffirmed the hermeneutical validity of Connell’s observation that “adolescence is, generally speaking, a great moment of naturalization of gender because of the major transformations of the body that occur at this time, which go hand in hand with the entry into genital sexuality and the (social) metamorphosis into men or women”.
5This has been highlighted in numerous feminist studies (Delphy, 1988; Federici, 2019; Tisdell, 2008).
6Known as “standpoint feminist theory”, feminist epistemology identifies and challenges forms of sexism, such as hierarchical relations between the masculine and feminine, which includes the production of contemporary knowledge, without losing sight of the intersectionality of power relations (Haraway, 1988; Hesse-Biber, 2008; Clair, 2016; Aboim, 2016). It should be noted that feminist epistemology is not homogeneous. For an overview, see Harding (2004).
7For an overview of different theoretical approaches, see Gottzén, Mellström & Shefer (2021), especially the introduction (pp. 1-17).
8An ideal type is an abstract type or category that helps us understand or theorize certain phenomena without claiming that the characteristics of a certain type are always and completely present in the observed phenomena.
9Loïc Wacquant (2012) uses this term to refer to “neoliberalism”.
10This third model was particularly prevalent in families where both parents had relatively high and comparable levels of education, worked in the education or care sector, earned roughly the same salary, and took turns looking after children, particularly due to differing working hours.
11Even if this clear-cut view is occasionally challenged by the discourse of female empowerment (Kim & Ringrosse, 2018).
12Victim-blaming practices ignore complex entanglements between the public and private in relation to intimacy.
13Factor analyses serve to identify repeating patterns in datasets and observe common characteristics within these patterns. These analyses can be used to group variables, visualize data clusters, refine analysis and nuance interpretations.
14The FASTCLUS procedure can be applied to databases containing at least 100 observations. It performs a disjoint cluster analysis based on distances calculated from one or more quantitative variables. Observations are divided into clusters so that each observation belongs to one and only one cluster. The PROC FASTCLUS initialization method ensures that all distances between observations in the same cluster are smaller than all distances between observations in other clusters. There was no imperative requirement to standardize the variables since they use the same units of measurement, and the results were similar in both cases.
15Data from 8 students had to be excluded due to lack of responses.
16Differences in results between clusters are only shown if they are statistically significant (p > 0.001).
17Egalitarianism is defined here as promoting equal values and rights for everyone in political, economic and/or social matters within a specific context.
18One of the earliest expressions of intersectionality can be found in the mythical 1977 “A Black Feminist Statement” from the Combahee River Collective: “The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, the same sexual attraction, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking”. (Combahee River Collective, 1983: p. 210). For a critique of the use of intersectionality, see Hill Collins and Bilge (2020).
19In a recent study on adolescent love affairs, French sociologist Isabelle Clair (2023) also highlights this fact: “Male power is based in a double movement: on the one hand, to distinguish oneself from girls and their concerns (of which love is conceived as one of the most important for them), and on the other hand, to dominate them, directly in interactions with them (including amorous interaction) and more indirectly, by getting used to occupying positions that are better remunerated than theirs (in the economic sense of the word but also in terms of prestige)” (2023: 56).
20This is intriguing given that 15% of the male sample say they have already fallen in love with a boy.
21Michel Bozon (2017: p. 46) has drawn the same conclusion.
22Tristan Bridges et Cheri Jo Pascoe (2016) have come to the same conclusion in their analysis of post-homophobic masculinity.
23See the definition of “gender” outlined by Bereni et al. (2020).
24According to Demetriou (2001), the hybridization of a model of masculinity involves the appropriation of values and attitudes that were not originally specific to it.
attitudes that were not originally specific to it.
25Bracke (2016: p. 8) defines subalternity as “the structured place from which the capacity to access power is radically obstructed”. The dimensions of cultural hegemony and political economy highlight the relational nature of these processes: classifying, categorizing and hierarchizing are the result of humans interacting with each other and their environments.