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http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1910101

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Can a Carbon Tax Be Effective without a Grand Coalition?

  AUTHORS: Amnon Levy

  KEYWORDS: Carbon Tax; Abstinence; Understating Expectations; Guilt; Emissions

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.4 No.1, February 12, 2014

  ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes an interaction between a carbon-tax collecting and investing coalition of rich countries, abstaining rich countries and poor countries. The non-coalition countries may suffer from loss of reputation and guilt and may overstate the emission-moderating effect of the carbon tax. As long as these three types of countries react to their counterparts’ emissions, taxing carbon-dioxide emissions unilaterally does not necessarily reduce the global emissions. Nor does it necessarily moderate the emissions of the coalition.