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https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351052306-44

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Models, Representation and Truth: On Giere’s Perspectival Realism

  AUTHORS: José Luis Rolleri

  KEYWORDS: Theory-Dependence, Independent World, Conceptual System, Ontological Commitment

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.12 No.3, August 30, 2022

  ABSTRACT: Could relativist theses about scientific theories be coherent with realist theses about the relationship between such theories and the physical world? This is the central issue of this paper that we approach, mainly, on Giere’s perspectival realism. We consider that his epistemological relativist theses are plausible and sustainable, but his realist thesis about the representational role that plays the theoretical models with respect to real systems as well as his thesis about true hypotheses are not. After trying to show that, we delineate an epistemological version of conceptual relativism which becomes cognate with Giere’s perspectival claims but that it does not comprise realist claims.