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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Deregulated Electricity Market and Auctions: The Italian Case

  AUTHORS: Luca Grilli

  KEYWORDS: Electricity Market, Auctions, Oligopoly, Deregulation

  JOURNAL NAME: iBusiness, Vol.2 No.3, September 30, 2010

  ABSTRACT: The Electricity Market (in Europe) undergoes a period of transformations never seen before. The competitive model suggested by the European Commission is based on a gradual increase in the classes of consumers able to choice, freely, their providers. In general, liberalization, deregulation, competition result in a spur to development and low prices for consumers. The Electricity Market isn’t likely to follow such a rule. Electricity Markets are best described and analyzed as first-price multi-unit procurement iterated auctions. In this paper we present an analysis of the Italian case in order to show the effects of deregulation on final prices for users.