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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-012-9188-5

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Impact of Executive Changes on Goodwill Impairment

  AUTHORS: Zhiqiang Li

  KEYWORDS: Executive Change, Goodwill Impairment, Audit Quality, A-Shares

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.11 No.2, February 27, 2020

  ABSTRACT: Based on the proxy theory, information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory, this paper empirically tests the impact of executive changes on goodwill impairment. It uses the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010-2018 as samples. The research results show that: 1) Compared with companies that have not undergone executive changes, companies that have undergone executive changes have a greater degree of goodwill impairment; 2) The positive correlation between executive changes and goodwill impairment is only manifested in the companies audited by “non-Big Four”, which implies that high audit quality can effectively play an external monitoring role and curb the opportunistic behavior of senior management.