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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Brand Franchise Supply Chain Partnership Based on Online and Offline Integrating Strategy

  AUTHORS: Rong Wang

  KEYWORDS: Brand Franchise Supply Chain; Transfer Payment Contract; Online-Offline Integrating Strategy; VMI Policy; Scale Economic Effect

  JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, Vol.3 No.4, July 26, 2013

  ABSTRACT: Taking advantage of online shopping affecting major parameters of corporate business including customer experience, customer word-of-mouth diffusion and customer complaints sharing, price elastic of consumer demand, and consumer brand loyalty, this paper focuses on the role of brand franchise supply chain partnership in the online and offline integrating environment. The findings suggest that the transfer payment shall be the critical contract clause to coordinate the brand franchise supply chain partnership to implement Pareto optimal strategy on VMI policy. Moreover, the optimal transfer payment has a strong positive relativity with the complementary of the online-offline shopping and VMI scale economic effect, whereas negative relativity with the substitutability of the online-offline shopping and VMI holding cost. The more VMI scale economic effect enhances, the larger online-offline integrating shopping market shares and the more system revenue shall be obtained in the brand franchise supply chain whereas taking advantage of the less transfer payment. The more VMI holding cost decreases, the larger online-offline integrating shopping market shares and the more system revenue shall be obtained in the brand franchise supply chain whereas taking advantage of the less transfer payment.